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TOWARDS A PRACTICE OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH
Ethan J. Leib*
Every page of The Federalist Papers is a call to the people of America to
take its fate into its own hands and to fashion its institutions in the light of the
best political science of the present rather than to look timidly to the past.
1
The good citizen of today can do no less.
The truth is that no part of the present-day government is well suited, by
virtue of practical capacity or political intervention, to undertake the job of
structural and episodic reconstruction [of the political public sphere]. The
mission lacks-as every novel and serious mission in the world does-its
proper agent. The best response, then, is to forge the new agent: another
branch of government, another power in the state, designed, elected, and
funded with the express charge of carrying out this distinctive rights-ensuring
work. Such a move, however, would demand the very openness to
institutional experimentalism in which contemporary law and contemporary
2
democracies have proved so remarkably deficient.

I. INTRODUCTION: GETTING RIGHT DOWN TO THE BUSINESS OF DESIGN
Proposals for practical institutional reforms are notoriously absent from
discussions about deliberative democracy. Joshua Cohen may be right that
we will need a lot more data from political psychologists before we can
reasonably take a stab at proposing such reforms. 3 But it is also imperative
to engage in the "nuts and bolts" debate of just what kinds of changes we
Law Clerk Designate, The Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. B.A., Yale University; M. Phil., University of
Cambridge; M.A., Yale University; J.DJPh.D. Candidate, Yale University. I wish to thank
Bruce Ackerman and the participants in the "Deliberation and Democratic Engagement" panel
at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting in August 2001, where the
ideas in this Article were first presented to a deliberating public.
*
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JUDITH N. Sm.AR, AMERICAN CmzENsIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 10 (1991).

2. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGA. ANALYSIS BEcoMoE? 33
(1996) (emphasis added).
3. See generally Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND PoLITIcs 67, 85 (James Bohman &
William Rehg eds., 1997) (1989) [hereinafter DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS].
359
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discourse theorists or deliberative democrats want to effect. Amy Gutmann
and Dennis Thompson claim that deliberative democracy is "in search of a
theory." 4 I think it is in search of an operationalized practice. To this end,
instead of the usual law review tactic of summarizing current research for
fifty pages and then making my contribution on the final two, I will just get
right to it. And the gist of the idea is to give some serious consideration to
Unger's idea that we need a new branch of government. He never provided
any details; I hope not to provide too many.
Some theorists have not been so shy in suggesting some practical ideas
on behalf of institutionalized deliberation. Robert Dahl has suggested that
each citizen be required to serve on an advisory council to an elected official
for a single year. 5 The advisory board's membership would be in constant
electronic correspondence with one another and would serve as an
institutional mechanism to check representatives at the legislative level. This
is not substantially different from Peter deLeon's endorsement of what he
terms "Participatory Policy Analysis" ("PPA"), where randomly-selected
citizens who might plausibly be affected by a particular policy are
conscripted to meet expert policymakers and bureaucrats to give their input
into administrative matters over the course of a year.6 Notoriously
undemocratic, the administrative bodies who make critical governmental
decisions might benefit from consultation and deliberation with some lay
citizens. John Bumheim has more radically called for the end of
representative democracy as we know it. Instead, he would like to
institutionalize deliberation by having small random samples of citizens
debate various political issues and set policy for the polity as a whole. 7 And
James Fishkin, less radically and with greater caution, has argued that public
opinion polls should be replaced with (what he terms and trademarks)
"Deliberative Polls," where approximately 500 people gather to debate
issues and come to more informed public opinions. 8 The polls are designed
4. AMY GuTmANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 1 (1996).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT ALAN DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD
SOCIETY 149-50 (1970) [hereinafter AFTER THE REVOLUTION]; ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY

AND n'S Carncs 340 (1989).
6. See generally PETER DELEON, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICY SCIENCES (1997).
7. See JOHN BURNHEim, Is DEMOCRACY PossIBLE?: THE ALTERNATIVE TO ELECTORAL
PoLirIcs 111-13 (1985).
8. See JAMES S. FISnKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEw DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION]; JAMES S. FISHKIN,
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1997) [hereinafter VOICE OF THE
PEOPLE]; James S. Fishkin & Robert Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to DemocraticDialogue,
in A POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE: THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION EXPERIMENT IN POLmCAL
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to represent more accurately what an informed body would decide if it were
equipped with relevant information to make a decision, precisely the kind of
information voters often lack in all sorts of elections. By using random
samples to make policy recommendations, Fishkin hopes to achieve
deliberative input into governmental units wdle revitalizing civic
participation more generally as citizens get themselves informed. But, in
effect, he leaves all governmental institutions untouched by deliberation, or
capable of ignoring popular will, because the deliberations are only involved
9
in processes of opinion-formation.
Here I would like to try to synthesize a reform proposal of my own
based upon three major assumptions. Without argument, I assume a largely
discourse-theoretic view of democracy that takes for granted the republican
virtue of collective self-government as well as the Kantian claim that each
citizen should be the author of his own laws. This democratic intuition has
been aptly described as follows: "Popular political self-government is first of
all the ongoing social project of authorship of a country's fundamental laws
by the country's people in some nonfictively attributable sense." 10 I further
COMMUNICATION (Max McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999); James S. Fishkin, Reflections
on DeliberativeDemocracy (Paper delivered to the Yale Political Theory Workshop, October
5, 1999).
9. Fishkin's work-in conjunction with the work of Ned Crosby, who studies civic
juries (a term he has trademarked)-has spawned a literature into which this Article neatly
fits. My proposal is different from each of the ones offered in this literature, and I will have
occasion elsewhere to outline some of those differences only once I sketch the general idea.
The ones with a 'family resemblance' are BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLrICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); JOHN GASTL., BACK BY POPULAR DEMAND:
REVrrALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS (2000); Ned
Crosby et al., Citizen Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation,46 PUB.ADMIN. REv.
170 (1986); Ned Crosby, Citizen Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environment Questions, in
FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR
ENvmoNMoENTAL DISCOURSE 157 (Ortwin Renn et al.eds., 1995); and Simon Threlkeld, A
Blueprintfor DemocraticLaw-making: Give Citizen Juriesthe Final Say, 28 POL'Y 5 (1998).
Though I developed my idea before finding Threlkeld's five-page comment, it turns out that
the ideas there are remarkably similar to the ones here. Mine, however, is far more developed,
less utopian, and respects the current regime of representation and separation of powers
(something Barber assuredly does not do either). Moreover, Threlkeld and Barber suffer an
infinite regress problem because they want to see citizen juries do everything, even though
they pay virtually no attention to the agenda-setting problem. Nevertheless, when I found
Threlkeld's work a year after I completed the first draft of this Article, I was struck with how
little attention it has received. I hope that doesn't bode ill for the attention this Article is to
receive.
10. Frank Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique of
Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 145, 146-
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assume that our constitutional democracy attempts to approximate this virtue
for its citizenry by aggregating preferences and sanctioning some rule by
majority, all while checking people's preferences by enforcing some basic
norms of equality." In this regard, I follow JUrgen Habermas: "[T]he
democratic procedure for the production of law evidently forms the only
postmetaphysical source of legitimacy."' 12 The last major assumption I make
is that face-to-face interaction more closely embodies some democratic
ideals than certain forms of representative bodies or virtual/electronic
13
communication.
I try to steer clear of clarifying the foundational defenses for
fundamental rights that are inviolable by majorities-this is the task of much
political theory and provides much of the justification for judicial review
47.
11. For an elaborate explanation of the uses and disadvantages of majoritarianism for
life, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 27-33. In this proposal, supermajorities play
a role, which requires a somewhat different strategy of defense. See infra Part IV.H.
12. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETwEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIscoURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 448 (William Rehg trans. & ed., 1996) (1992).
13. Iris Marion Young makes a good case for why face-to-face relations ought not
necessarily be privileged. She claims that "[t]he ideal [of face-to-face democracy] presumes a
myth of unmediated social relations, and wrongly identifies mediation with alienation ....It
implies a model of the good society as consisting of decentralized small units which is both
unrealistic and politically undesirable, and which avoids the political question of just relations
among such decentralized communities. "IUS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITcs OF
DIFFERENCE 232-33 (1990). She considers such a model "wildly utopian" and thinks "[a]
model of a transformed society must begin from the material structures that are given to us at
this time in history." Id. at 233-34. Last, she urges that "[p]olitics must be conceived as a
relationship of strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate
sense, relating across time and distance." Id. at 234. As will become evident here, I actually
agree with (and account for) many of Young's perspectives and think my proposal addresses
some of her concerns by keeping room for less 'direct-democratic' and more representative
institutions, while ultimately endorsing a face-to-face deliberative model.
I am most convinced of the virtues of face-to-face democracy when considering what
Elaine Scarry has called "the difficulty of imagining other people." Elaine Scarry, The
Difficulty of Imagining Other People, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LMITS OF

PATRIOTISM 98 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996) (1993). By insisting on the opacity of the other,
Scarry's argument takes account of Young's critiques of liberalism. Of course, Scarry recruits
this "difficulty" to establish a justification for constitutionalism over cosmopolitan largesse,
whereas I see deliberative democracy as a potential source for helping us with this difficultythe difficulty that we cannot act on behalf of others unless we know or confront them in some
nonfictive sense. In his more romantic moments, Fishkin seems to justify deliberative
democracy along similar lines, especially when telling us anecdotes of radical paradigm shifts
in people's attitudes when they come to appreciate the situation of an other in the course of
his polling weekends.
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and the separation of powers. 14 Instead, I want to focus upon the dynamics
of how better to approximate our approximation of democracy, not upon the
teleological arguments for where we should end up in some utopian world or
ranting about why we should end up there. I want to find a tweak, a
tinkering, for our current system that would make it more generally.
desirable, making the three assumptions above with respect to what counts
as desirable. I expect that the proposal should be attractive to democrats and
republicans (lowercase 'd' and 'r') of all colors as long as they are not biggovernment liberals, who are generally distrustful that people should be
authors of their own laws. As long as "we the people" are not treated as a
political fiction impossible to conceive or construct in reality, my proposal
looks to give substance to what the rhetorical refrain could mean, in the best
of cases. Even if William Riker is right that Americans are governed by
institutions, and not themselves, 15 American institutions can have more
direct input from institutionalized deliberation, ensuring better levels of selfgovernment. And the critics of deliberative democracy who see it as "rule by
the articulate" 16 or as insensitive to power relations, 17 should see in my
proposal mechanisms to allay their concerns, helping them trust the people,
who they claim to want to help.
A. The Proposal
I propose a new branch of government to add to our system of checks
and balances. In addition to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches, the people need to have a more distinct voice in a branch of their
own. Let us call such a branch Popularinsofar as it aims to instantiate our
14. For a proposal on how better to ensure democratic values through the separation of
powers, see Bruce Ackerman's defense of "constrained parliamentarianism" in Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 634 (2000).
15. See generally WIULAM RIElR, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETwEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).

16. See Richard A. Epstein, Modem Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97
YALE L.J. 1633, 1642 (1988). More recently, some have lashed out against "pluralistic
logocracy." See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-DemocraticPolyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J.
313, 330 (1997). But as Cohen and Sabel astutely note, "the potential for deliberative failure
is no argument against efforts at [deliberative] improvement." Id.
17. See Ian Shapiro, Enough of Deliberation:Politics Is About Interests and Power, in
DELIBERATIVE PoLmcs: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 28-38 (Stephen Macedo
ed., 1999); see also YOUNG, supra note 13, at 233-34. For a comprehensive argument for why
one should be suspicious of my entire enterprise, see Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation,
25 POL THEORY 347 (1997). Sanders's argument is well worth attention, though my project
addresses many of her concerns with deliberative institutions.

HeinOnline -- 33 Rutgers L.J. 363 2001-2002

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:359

ideas about popular sovereignty more concretely. As a practical matter, this
branch would aim to replace the initiative and referendum processes; its
institution would be established to address many of the shortcomings of
those forms of direct democracy. Its functions could be brought about
through national or state constitutional amendments, 18 and its findings
would enact laws-laws that could be repealed or vetoed by the relevant
(state or federal) Executive or Legislative branch (with a two-thirds
supermajority), or could be challenged in the Judicial branch. Though these
vehicles for overruling deliberative decisions should be available in any
conception of the institutional design, I would suspect that they would not
often be exercised for fear of evidencing a patina of anti-democratic
authoritarianism.
Composed of stratified random samples of 525 eligible-though not
necessarily registered-voters, debating in groups of approximately fifteen,
the Popular branch would take the form of small civic juries occasionally
meeting in plenary sessions to get their "charge." Such juries would debate
political policies at assemblies convened for such purposes and would be
modeled on the basis of Fishkin's Deliberative Polls, administered with the
degree of care that Fishkin takes to make his Deliberative Polls
representative, unbiased, and informed. Such juries would be called in
circumstances where ballot initiatives and referendums are called for
arbitration now. In this paradigm, the Popular branch would have the
authority to enact law, while the tasks of the Legislative and Executive
branches would include help with agenda-setting, framing, administration,
and tailoring the findings of the deliberative body into coherent written
statutes. They would also be responsible, as they are now, for dealing with
law-making processes so specialized as to have no substantial popular
interest, or interest of the Popular branch.
Jurisdiction of the Popular branch would depend on the policy question
at issue; both local and federal questions could be settled by representative
samples of citizens, though each would have slightly different but analogous
procedures to bring about "deliberative" settling of the question. 19 In the
18. Ironically, I need to depend on the functions of the other branches to 'create' my
newly-devised check on their authority. Of course, I never deny the legitimacy of nondeliberative governmental actions altogether, so this feature should become less ironic as the
discussion proceeds.
19. I do not mean to suggest that Fishkin's polls could not be used for many other
purposes at the administrative level. I view my proposal as consistent with, though not
dependent upon, such efforts. Most specifically, I am interested in seeing how Fishkin's
creation can be utilized to establish a better political public sphere, one more politically
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case of national assemblies, it would probably be better to have several
regional conventions where vote totals are aggregated, not weighted-one
person, one vote. Even large states might require regional samples for their
Popular activities.
Political concerns about which every citizen can have an informed
opinion (for example, affirmative action, school desegregation, or presumed
consent for organ donation) would be put to a group of random citizens to
decide over the course of a few days either at the state or national level.
Often these types of political opinions are remarkably uninformed, and since
these are the issues likely to find themselves on the agenda, the deliberative
assembly would help settle questions that demand more thoughtful
consideration by the electorate.
I would impose a relatively high threshold for putting the question to a
policy jury from the direct democratic route of agenda-setting (i.e., what
could now be known as the Popular initiative process). Thus, ten percent of
the relevant voting population would need to agree to place a proposal on the
deliberative agenda (not agree to the proposal itself), and the signatures of
those advocates would need to be geographically distributed throughout the
state or nation in some equitable fashion. 2 0 Given the proliferation of ecorrespondence, e-mail signatures could count for the direct Popular
mechanism, but ways to curb corruption, a common problem with signaturegathering in general, would need to be implemented. Perhaps Colorado is
exemplary: a random sample of the signatures representative of the whole
21
list is drawn and only the selected names get verified.
From the less direct democratic route, the referendum, a supermajority
of one legislative house along with a simple majority of the other-another
high threshold-could send an item onto the Popular agenda for
adjudication. Because legislators are already trained in the ways of statutedrafting, it would be advantageous to have joint committees come together
to draft a statute for Popular consideration. Since the drafters would know
that their bills would ultimately be subject to the careful scrutiny of 525

significant than heightened attention to candidate horseraces.
20. In 1992, of the twenty-seven states that had some form of initiative and/or
referendum, one-third of them had a signature threshold at ten percent or above. Of those
nine, seven were at ten percent, so I arbitrarily follow those states. See David B. Magleby,
Governing by Initiative: Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. CoLw. L. REV. 13, 22 (1995). The geographic distribution
criterion could be flexible depending on what locale is most affected by the policy at issue.
21. Id. at 22-23.
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jurors, they would be forced to be clear and specific if they want to achieve
Popular acceptance. Riders would fall off the wagon.
After achieving acceptance from the Popular branch, a law would need
to be signed by the President (or Governor). To be sure, the Executive and
Legislative branches (with an appropriate supermajority) could veto the
Popular branch's decision, assuming they want to risk impeachment or recall
for contravening the informed will of the people.
Finally, judges at the appellate level (in both the federal and state court
systems) could, by a mere majority, en banc, convene a Popular assembly to
settle a popular question. Of course, in the case of convocation by the
Judiciary, the Popular branch has more of a recommending and
informational capacity than a lawmaking one. The branch's decisions are not
binding only because in this kind of affair, more similar to the Fishkin
model, citizens are not debating law, but public opinion. In this manner, both
representative and direct mechanisms could place an item on the Popular
agenda and have input into all branches of government.
Such a new branch of government would necessitate a new body of
administration in charge of regulating, organizing, and preparing the
deliberative jury process. The body would process requests for adjudication
by deliberative assembly, which could come from the legislatures, the
judiciaries, or the people themselves. The administrative body would make
sure the early stages of statute-drafting and signature-garnering proceed
without corruption by moneyed interests. During the preparation of the
informational and factual materials to be used as the bases for deliberation,
the administrative body would help pare down and focus the debate, making
it 'debatable' over the course of three or four days. But their contribution
would be procedural, not substantive, assuming that such a distinction is
tenable. As an example of what such a body might look like, consider Arne
Leonard's vision of a statewide "Citizen's Commission on Constitutional
Amendment" ("CCCA"):
An independent commission to consist of nine members .. which shall be
composed of six appointed members and three elected members. Each of the
following state officials shall appoint one person to serve as a member of the
CCCA: the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate; the Governor; the Attorney General; the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court; and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. No more
than three of the appointed members of the CCCA shall be from the same
political party. Registered electors shall elect three members of the CCCA
[directly]. Elected members of the CCCA may not simultaneously hold
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another elected state office. All members of the CCCA shall serve for a term
of four years from the date they are elected or appointed ... [and] shall
prescribe its own rules of order and procedure in accordance with the State
Administrative Procedure Act. The legislature shall provide suitable quarters
for the CCCA, appropriate funds for its lawful expenses, and compensate its
22
members for their services.
Mutatis mutandis, this kind of commission could be replicated at different
levels of government (citywide, statewide, and nationwide) and could help
administer deliberative assemblies and arbitrate among "stakeholders," as
well as maintain the integrity of the deliberative process. Leonard wants to
institutionalize this commission to help make initiatives and referendums
more deliberative; my proposal goes further to counteract the dynamics of
mass democracy evidenced in the general initiative and referendum
procedures currently in place. Because I do not rely strictly on the educative
potential of deliberation, and because I care about its potential for popular
will-formation, I require a much deeper reorganization of initiatives and
referendums.
In my adaptation of Leonard's council, I continue to allow parties to
play some role and thus leave seats on the relevant commission for party
appointments. The parties would be able to appoint members to the Popular
branch, but no more than three appointees (of the nine sitting members at
each level) may be from the same party. I expect that there would be state
commissions for state and local questions and a national commission for
federal questions, so the business of who gets to make the appointments
would depend on the particular jurisdiction of the administrative body.
Leonard's proposal is for a statewide body, but, realistically, the general
party structure would run the confirmation proceedings, regardless of what
level of government the council oversees. Let the parties do the work of
appeasing themselves and the public.
But the last three members (the swing votes, in a manner of speaking)
would be elected directly by voters. The candidates for these offices would
not be able to take money from any party for their campaigns. Instead, the
citizens running for Popular office could only apply for public money to
help run their campaigns after jumping through the usual hoops that
candidates always must. Their campaigns could only be funded with public
monies or personal fortunes, and no private interests would be allowed to
22. Ame R. Leonard, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law: In Search of the
Deliberative Initiative: A Proposalfor a New Method of Constitutional Change, 69 TEMP. L.
REv. 1203, 1236 (1996).
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use their weight for even independent expenditures. Maybe this would mean
that only people like Jon Corzine (D), Steve Forbes (R), and Ross Perot (I)
could run. But their role is mostly to shuffle through papers and proposals
and summarize contents, work that their staffs would do with greater
precision in any event. To be sure, my assumption that the administrations
would be value-free is optimistic at best. But with wide measures to ensure
the integrity of the branch and with the publicity associated with every step
of the process, the scrutiny of the mass media and the general population
would probably keep the administrative body in check.
Among the most preliminary and prominent problems with current
initiative and referendum procedures is that, by and large, only groups with
substantial financial backing can afford to garner the necessary signatures to
get a proposal on the ballot or afford the media campaigns often necessary to
force a legislative referendum. 2 3 Even in my model, special interest groups
with a lot of cash will be more likely to be able to get their initiatives
considered by a deliberative body. But one of the main purposes for my
proposal is to take away some of the power of the purse by subjecting each
proposed policy to deliberative bodies, not to an uninformed,
unrepresentative minority of voters very susceptible to manipulation by
efforts taken in the mass media. Mass democracy suffers from this problem,
brought about by an undisciplined populism. 24 Consider this evidence:
Most voters face an informational vacuum

. .

.

Previous research has

demonstrated that significant numbers vote in ways inconsistent with their
preferences on the issue generally. Take the case of a 1980 California rent
control initiative ....

Citing its exit poll, the Los Angeles Times concluded

that "voters apparently ended up confused and suspicious of the proposition."
Analysis of this exit poll demonstrates that more than half of all California
voters were confused about what a 'yes' and 'no' vote meant. Over threefourths of California voters did not match their views on rent control with
their vote on the proposition: twenty-three percent wanted to protect rent
control but incorrectly voted 'yes,' and fifty-four percent were opposed to
25
rent control but incorrectly voted 'no.'
Providing voters with information pamphlets to help explain ballots has not
met with great success either, since no one reads them. This renders voters
23. Magleby, supra note 20, at 36.
24. id. at 37-40.
25. Id. at 38-39 (citing Roger Smith & Dorothy Townsend, Proposition 10: Its Defeat
Hailedand Lamented, L.A. TIMEs, June 5, 1980, at 1, 22).
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particularly susceptible to influences in the mass media, usually funded by
big money.
In the deliberative bodies of the Popular assemblies, sound-bites would
be scrutinized. And advertising aimed at the mass public will always come
up shy of its target because efforts to reach the randomly-selected jury (of
525) will always be unlikely at best. Demagogues who whip the masses into
a froth might still be able to get items on the agenda in this possible world,
but proposed policies would still have to pass deliberative scrutiny to get
enacted Popularly. The proposal here is aimed at forcing Americans to be
more responsible with direct democracy such that they are more likely to be
able to enjoy its fruits.
The Judiciary could, on this model, make sure that the findings of the
deliberative bodies cohere with the standards of "equal protection" in some
substantial fashion. Since the actual deliberations would be preserved in
transcripts (anonymously to protect privacy), judges would have access to
the thought-processes of the relevant voters. In many cases of judicial review
of direct democracy, judges try to interpret what they think the voters must
have been thinking when they cast their ballots on a statute that they most
likely could not possibly comprehend. In the case of judicial review of
deliberative assemblies, judges would have transcripts to facilitate
understanding more clearly the preferences of the 'lawmakers.' And
administering post-deliberation surveys would help get more direct
26
statements of the 'intention of the lawmakers.'
Justices could still uphold basic constitutional provisions to avert
tyranny of the majority and unacceptable deliberative findings. Instead of
making the circular argument that all good procedures will produce fair
results, 27 I appreciate the concern of the critics of deliberative democracy
who rightly fear that, in practice, deliberation will often produce illiberal
and 'undemocratic' outcomes that might further entrench already
inegalitarian power relations. To be sure, this has been a problem with direct
democracy in general. But I am not as worried about such outcomes, because
I acknowledge the importance of the institutional mechanisms we already
have in place that would curb, or at least work against, such outcomes. Yet
the benefits of a better approximation of legitimacy suggest strongly

26. This advantage of deliberative assemblies is also relied upon by Cohen & Sabel,
supra note 16, at 337.
27. For that argument, see generally HABERMAS, supra note 12; and Joseph Traub,
Discriminationin Plebiscites:Discursive Irrationality,6 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 99,
112-14 (1996/1997).
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deliberative input. Since I am not idealizing deliberation as the only source
of legitimacy, I think I am on stronger grounds for demanding it.
But judicial opinions, while continuing their Herculean task of checking
28
tyrannical majorities, would also be subject to some Popular constraints.
The courts would not be able to base their opinions on some tendentious
assessment of popular will, without actually gauging Popular support in a
deliberative body. Judiciaries could also call for deliberative juries at state
and national levels, especially if they want to adhere to some of Richard
Posner's enthusiasm for social science in judicial decision-making. 2 9 Indeed,
they would be so required if they want to base a decision upon something
"deeply rooted in this Nation's . . .tradition." 30 Traditions, particularly
"national" ones, would be perfect topics for deliberative control; it seems
obvious that only the people can testify to their traditions. Constituting a
people should not only be a top-down affair.
1. Compulsory Service
I would expect service in deliberative bodies at both local and federal
levels to be compulsory civic responsibilities, just as our society expects
jury service of its citizenry. But the legal mandate to participate in
deliberative bodies would be far more involved and involving than jury duty:
endless deferments and excuses would not be tolerated. If one is eligible to
vote, she is eligible to be conscripted for a deliberative assembly. Providing
translation services for citizens who do not speak English, a reasonable
stipend, and traveling expenses, would maximize response rates. Because the
voluntary response problem is usually considered one of the most damning
28. Habermas, though critiquing Ronald Dworkin for his use of the Herculean judge in
a hardly more responsible fashion than CLS, still seems slightly too judge-centric. See
HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 211-22.
Alas, Habermas never makes the kind of 'nuts and bolts' recommendations I do here
to allow the norm of discourse to trickle down into the sphere of popular will-formation.
Instead, Habermas thinks deliberative democracy at the level of the judiciary is almost enough
to guarantee equal concern and respect. As long as judges take account of what they think
each citizen would say if each citizen had access to the forms of discourse, Habermas is
willing to compromise and let a liberal constitutional democracy pass discourse-theoretic
muster. I doubt we can be this complacent.
29. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999).

30. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). ("[Tihe statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.").
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shortcomings of deliberative models and referendums, 3 1 mandatory
service-maybe not jail time, but serious repercussions in the form of fines
or community service---could avoid that route of delegitimizing the Popular
forum.
Moreover, mandatory service on policy juries could become a feature
constitutive of American citizenship in an age where there are few aspects of
political culture that unify citizens. By stigmatizing the act of not serving, by
creating a political culture wherein actual citizens are called upon to make
decisions that impact their lives in extraordinary ways, the costs of not
taking part could become rather severe in civil society. But this is more
sociological speculation than it is an argument.
2. The End of Tacit Consent
Since it may be that the aggregation of commodified private votes can
never amount to consent (including the tacit sort we have grown so reliant
upon), I have set up my schema to address this democratic dilemma. Yet I
substitute a random sample for the population and expect each deliberator to
cast a vote in private. Nonetheless, the deliberations should remain public;
the deliberations would be recorded and transcribed to create a public
document reporting not only the final vote tally but also what was said at the
assembly. However, since each person could have been selected for the
deliberative body, and each person will be drafted to serve multiple times,
consent is generally made more explicit (and draft-dodgers would have to
accept the decisions of the juries because they affirmatively refuse to be
decision-makers). Substantive representation is more likely to be achieved in
this paradigm than it is in our current representative regime where criteria
for representation must always be formalistic and substitutional. Because the
institutionalized bargaining function of representatives that often skews
representativeness is largely shielded away from my deliberative institution,
citizens can decide for themselves what is worth compromising. But the
problems with representation are hardly definitively solved. I am only
31. Turnouts for special elections for ballot initiatives are stunningly low. And those
who do turn out are "better educated, older, better off, and more ideological than voters in
general elections." Magleby, supra note 20, at 32. For more on why direct democracy cannot
be trusted (giving further reasoning for the approach taken here), see Sherman J. Clark, A
Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REv. 434 (1998). Fishkin supposes that
he circumvents the problem with stratified random samples that are representative of the
public at large with respect to demographics and preferences, but he, too, experiences the
voluntary response problem. See FIsHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELBERATION, supra note 8, at
81-104.
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hoping to do better than we currently do in the quest of achieving the
political ends that a thoughtful group would endorse.
3. Aggregation and Decision Procedures
Though deliberation is the primary form of decision-making in my
model, an aggregating procedure will be necessary at the conclusion of the
deliberations because I am concerned with popular will-formation, not only
public opinion. Since all deliberative assemblies would be convened to
decide binary questions (i.e., the jury is deciding Yes/No on some
proposition), a simple mechanism necessitating a supermajority could be
applied to each situation: 32 After deliberation, a private vote is taken where
jurors vote "Yes," "No," or "Abstain." If a two-thirds majority vote "Yes"
(of those voting "Yes" or "No"), the bill under consideration would pass. If a
three-fifths majority obtains, shy of two-thirds, I would call the jury hung,
keeping the question on the Popular agenda for further deliberative
assemblies to adjudicate.
Should the jury remain hung, those sponsoring the campaign would be
entitled to amend their proposition according to the feedback of the first
jury. Since the jury's deliberations would be publicly available, the sponsors
could tailor their proposal to the needs of the randomly selected jury even
though a different jury would be responsible for further consideration of the
proposal. The Commission would make sure that the changes are reasonable
and represent modification on the basis of pervasive comments that come
from the deliberators themselves. In any event, three mistrials (hung juries)
on any proposition would kill the bill. Of course, if neither a supermajority
nor a majority is achieved, the measure officially fails and is taken off the
deliberative agenda, even supposing that a simple majority might serve as a
recommendation to the parties to adopt similar measures by traditional
means.
If the proposition came from the people with an initiative-style
campaign, it should not come before the branch by this mechanism for three
years. Still, during this three-year period, a legislature or judiciary could
demand Popular input on a similar question. If a question is put before the
Popular assembly by legislators, they would not be able to bring a
substantially similar measure within three years either, though an initiative
campaign or a judiciary could get a substantially similar measure before the
32. A detailed defense for supermajority requirements can be found in

DE-NiS

MUELLER, CONSTITUONAL DEmocPAcy 97, 180-87 (1996). I treat the issue at greater length

infra Part IV.H.
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Popular branch during the same period. For more details about the proposed
system of checks and balances, with more attention to ratification and veto
powers, turn to Part IR.
4. Agenda-Setting
Of course it would not make sense to have deliberative assemblies set
the agenda for other deliberative juries. Hence, I still need some of the basic
mechanisms in place that currently allow for initiatives to be brought before
the public. Most often, advocates of a proposal need collect the signatures of
a small percentage of the population at issue. Those signatures are
sometimes checked for corruption and the proposal is guided by some basic
constraints of wording and reasonable procedural constraints, like subjectmatter jurisdiction. 3 3 Alternatively, legislatures or appellate judiciaries
could decide to put questions on the agenda.
In Part VI, I tackle the most difficult and central problem of agendasetting and framing. As a teaser, I think there are two approaches to this
challenge: one concrete and the other more theoretical. The concrete
approach suggests that candidates in general elections may, given this
reconstituted regime, start running on the basis of the questions they want to
put to the public to decide in the Popular branch. In this way, citizens will
have some access to the referendum (as opposed to the initiative) agendasetters. Of course, I could not require candidates to have their platforms
include what they will put to juries to decide. But empirical evidence
suggests that candidates in states that make wide use of the referendum often
run on platforms that endorse facilitation of public decision-making on
various items of interest to the candidates and the public. 3 4
The theoretical approach is a form of "the civil society argument"-citizens, in their civil societies, their smaller public spheres, will frame
issues themselves for the use of the political public sphere. 35 A radical shift
in campaign funds appropriation could facilitate this process by adopting
Fishkin's sketch of a voucher system, elaborated upon in Bruce Ackerman's
33. Magleby, supra note 20, at 25. "Subjects excluded from the ballot in some states
include naming a person to office by initiative, emergency legislation, and using the
referendum to block appropriations. Some states 'require that a measure may not encompass
more than a single subject."' Id. (citing CAi. CONST. art. 2, § 8(d); FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3;
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(d)). These seem like reasonable and necessary procedural means to
help measures of direct democracy function more efficiently-and may make elites more
likely to trust the proposal in general.
34. See id. at 29.
35. Here I employ Habermasian jargon to be clarified infra Parts V & VI.
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"Patriot Proposal," wherein every citizen could allocate some public funds
to the interest group of her choice. 3 6 In Part VI, I use these reform efforts to
gesture toward my own mechanism. In the meantime, if and when civil
societies fail us, we will just have to trust our representatives to do a
reasonable job of presenting as many alternatives and arguments as possible
by forcing them to employ non-partisan help in arbitrating between partisan
arguments. 3 7 I could spend time worrying about how biased and mediadriven information sources might be, but the anti-utopian institution tinkerer
always uses the shadow of the present situation to gauge progress.
5. Branches
This scheme very much depends on the interaction of the various
branches. 3 8 Surely, one cannot depend upon deliberation for all our
'democratic' decisions. We must often leave it to other features of
institutional design in other branches to enact the virtues of "political
equality" and "nontyranny." Thus, I have no reason to do away with general
elections, courts, and administrative bodies; I need them to continue their
administrative, oversight, legislative, statute-tailoring and interpretive
capacities. Every citizen could not be expected to gain expertise in
lawmaking, nor should it be desirable that they spend much of their time
doing so. Thus, I would imagine that the construction of the fine details of
obscure code would still be left in the hands of the agencies. To protect
against tyranny of the majority, the judiciary would still have a substantial
role in such a government to prevent abuses of the Popular branch. Just as
referendums have had illiberal outcomes in the past, we should reasonably
fear that deliberative bodies will make some bad decisions. But judicial
review of even this form of direct democracy is not entirely inappropriate,
and it should be welcomed in our attempt to balance republicanism and

36. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 99-100; Bruce
Ackerman, Creditingthe Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 AM. PROSPECT
71-80 (1993).
37. In this spirit, see the proposal for the CCCA by Leonard, supra note 22, and
accompanying text at Part I.A.
38. Fishkin does not give enough attention to the value of the separation of powers in
his work. This lacking inspires my proposal's excessive fixation thereupon. See infra Part Ill.
There, I spell out more explicitly these sorts of considerations. The insight here is that we can
trust direct democracy if we have the right checks in place. Instead of doing away with direct
democracy and depending solely upon representation, we can have a branch that really
includes independent individuals coming together to make law.
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liberalism, popular rule and avoidance of a tyrannous majority. 39 Though
the Executive (President or Governors) and a two-thirds supermajority of the
relevant legislatures should be 'allowed' to repeal or veto laws enacted by
deliberative assemblies, such action is likely to be political suicide, if not
perceived as authoritarian. But judges sometimes need to take the lead and
be 'undemocratic' in extraordinary circumstances. Similarly, the Popular
branch could check some judicial abuses as well by contesting 'general will'
claims that occasionally appear in judicial decisions as a basis for deciding
law; instead, judges would have to call for a deliberative jury to assess
popular will. Because I wish to avoid infinite regress on the one hand, and
inattention to redressing discrimination on the other, my institutional reform
proposal does not take the form of a radical overthrow of our current system.
Nonetheless, real (semi-radical) changes are needed if popular sovereignty is
to be taken sufficiently seriously.
B. Summing Up and Roadmapping
Habermas appreciates the need for postmetaphysical thinking and thinks
we have little choice but to embrace such modes of argumentation "for
which no plausible alternatives exist." 40 The proposal at issue is not only
realistic and anti-utopian, but also has the capacity to transform our society
in such a way that would satisfy liberals and communitarians, consensus
theorists and agonistic political philosophers alike. It is realistic because our
political climate could absorb and afford such an institutional
reorganization. It requires a reshuffling of resources, but not total
redistribution of wealth, a reassessing of the implications of our form of
government, but not a reconsideration of whether democracy is the best form
of government. While it challenges our assumptions about what it means to
endorse 'representative' government, the proposal does not call for
undisciplined populist direct democracy. It is anti-utopian because it only
hopes to approximate an approximation somewhat better. It does not require
assent to some grand narrative other than our weak (or 'thin') democratic
one, where the people should actually have some input on a level more
informed and less economically-determined than the referendum of our
current representative regime. It is a practical way to make us feel more athome under our laws, which would be rendered more democratic if
39. See Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990)
(arguing that any form of direct democracy deserves a hard judicial look). For more on the
check of judicial review upon the Popular branch, see infra Part III.C.3.a40. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 443.
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subjected to the new branch of government I recommend. Though I suffer
from acute "polis envy," 4 1 I do not view the envy as a foolhardy malady;
many real ills and pathologies can be treated with a dose of deliberation. The
problem requires clever institutional design, even though I may fail to
persuade that my particular design is clever enough.
The proposal takes seriously both the ideals of individuality and
individual interests, and the politics of difference and group interests, though
I will not be able to spell out all of these advantages in this context. By
finding a place for procedural justice and neutrality (Part V), and taking the
civil society argument into account so that the state does not have a
monopoly on agenda-setting (Part VI), the proposal addresses a variety of
liberal and communitarian concerns, all while avoiding making difficult
fundamental-rights arguments for equality. Such arguments shall be left to
the theorists and the jurists (even the jurors!) as I try to argue for a practical
proposal to embody a dominant theme of American democratic life that
might support such a reform.4 2 No doubt, such a proposal rests on
foundational ideas insofar as I will need a theory of why governmental
institutions should preserve equality and facilitate heightened degrees of
self-government. I do not make such an argument here because though the
terms of what counts for equality are still on the table, that our equality
should be protected does not seem very controversial. And though the terms
of how directly the people should influence policy are still up for debate, it
seems uncontroversial that the realities of money and power often undo even
a trace of self-governance.
I shall devote the next Parts of the Article to elaborating upon the
proposal itself (Part 1I); to discussing the integration of the Popular branch
into the separation of powers and system of checks and balances (Part 1I);
and to meeting some powerful objections to the institution (Part IV). Only
then can I get theoretical by bringing "ideal" deliberative democracy back to
41. I take the term from FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8,at 90,
but he credits Bruce Ackerman with coining it. John McCormick claims that Stephen Holmes
should get credit, but I have no way of assessing McCormick's claim.
42. Here is the empirical support for the democratic climate to which I am appealing:
"Depending on the precise wording of the question, more than 50 percent of Americans
support the idea of national referenda [to supplant Congress and the President in making
certain categories of national decisions] and more than 80 percent support both the initiative
and the recall" of congressmen and senators once they have been in office for a year. Anthony
King, Running Scared, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
(January
1997),
available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jan/scared/scared.htm. These numbers are more recent
than, though corroborate similar findings and enthusiasm evidenced in, THOMAS E. CRONIN,
DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE PoLmcs OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 223-34 (1989).
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earth (Part V) and address that pestering difficulty of agenda-setting, which
requires theorizing further about civil society (Part VI).
II. ARGUING FOR ARGUING

Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to argue for "equal
concern and respect," I will still need to "argue for arguing," as Jon Elster
43
and James Johnson have put it.
Habermas writes, "Only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can
meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process." 4 4 For my
purposes, such a construction is too strong. Instead, I appeal to Fishkin's
intuitive suggestion that it is a "false dilemma" to suppose "that we must
choose between thoughtful but anti-democratic competence of elites on the
one hand, and the superficialities of mass democracy on the other." 4 5
Though his proposals for reform are too mild to address balancing his
trilemma of "political equality, tyranny of the majority, and deliberation," 4 6
I take the urgency of his construction to heart. His problematization begs for
a firm institutional role for deliberative processes, even if Madisonian
representative government must also play a role, despite its failure at
achieving deliberative decision-making.
The Federalist argument for representation, adopted by Fishkin, is rather
simple: James Madison wanted "to refine and enlarge the public views by
43. JON ELsTER, DELiBERATtVE DEMOCRACY 10 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). It is worth

reproducing the catalogue of justifications Elster provides, so the reader can place my
particular orientation into the matrix. Deliberation
reveals private information; lessens or overcomes the impact of bounded rationality;
forces or induces a particular mode of justifying demands; legitimizes the ultimate
choice; is desirable for its own sake; makes for Pareto-superior decisions; makes for
better decisions in terms of distributive justice; makes for larger consensus; [and]
improves the moral or intellectual qualities of the participants.
Id. at 11. Obviously, I do not embrace all of these potential benefits in service of my proposal.
Susan Stokes reminds us that deliberation has its own pathologies; much of my plan looks for
ways to circumvent the pathologies. Susan Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in
DEItERATIvE DEMocRAcy, supra, at 123. For example, Button and Mattson argue that there
is an overwhelming instinct to defer to experts in the deliberative situation, so that empirical
psychological fact should be kept in mind as one tries to implement the proposal here and
train the moderators of the small group discussions as Fishkin does. Mark Button & Kevin
Mattson, Deliberative Democracy in Practice: Challenges and Prospects for Civic
Deliberation,31 POLITY 609 (1999). For more on this corrective, see infra Part IV.F.
44. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 110.
45. FIsHKiN, DEMOcRACY AND DEUBERATION, supra note 8, at 3.
46. Id. at 12.

HeinOnline -- 33 Rutgers L.J. 377 2001-2002

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:359

passing them through the medium of a []body of citizens." 4 7 Alexander
Hamilton saw the representative body as an "opportunity for cool and sedate
reflection." 4 8 Such visions for American democracy, however, demand more
than legislative bodies taking part in mostly non-deliberative bargaining
situations. Access to "representative" bodies is usually limited to a group of
elites whose primary interests are fund-raising and interest-group pandering.
While "[c]ritics of [a more deliberative regime] tend to argue that nondeliberative processes might approximate the judgments people would reach
with fuller information and reflection-and save everyone decision costs
through the use of heuristics," Fishkin's evidence nearly proves that
"heuristics or shortcuts [cannot] plausibly proxy for deliberation." 49 I cannot
possibly survey Fishkin's evidence in this context, but I do assume that it
bears the claim that people change their minds as a result of deliberation and
that there is no shortcut to figuring out just how conversation will change
people's minds. 50 Moreover, pragmatically speaking, people may be more
likely to view decisions made in a deliberative body as having more
legitimacy than any heuristic. Given such a condition, there is no good
reason to avoid conversation when it can inspire not only more democratic
governance, but can also inculcate the kind of civic virtue so many political
theorists want to foster counteract the pathologies of individualism.
A. PopularSovereignty and Direct Democracy
Habermas writes, "Political opinion polls provide a certain reflection of
'public opinion' only if they have been preceded by a focused public debate
47. THE FEDERAUISTNo. 10, at 126 (J. Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
48. Id. No. 71, at 410 (A. Hamilton).
49. Fishkin, supra note 8, at 2-3. For the evidence, see Fismcn'N, VOICE OF THE PEOPLE,
supra note 8, at 205-09, 214-20; and Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8, at 14-29; Michael
Neblo, Deliberate Actions (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). What these
sources show is not only that a random sample of individuals can mirror the population's
views at large, but that minds (more than only occasionally and in statistically significant
numbers) are changed in the process. Whereas Fishkin and Luskin's work show deliberation
as effecting unpredictable outcomes, Neblo's work suggests that deliberative situations do
tend to produce outcomes with more "generalizability." Nonetheless, in either case,
deliberative input provides normative advantages, so a tendency toward certain outcomes
should not disturb us: the virtues of civic republicanism here can outweigh a possible
detectable predictability (for Neblo, two out of three instances show this effect) in deliberative
outcomes. For more analysis on Neblo's findings, see infra note 274.
50. For further evidence, see Button & Mattson, supra note 43. Again here we must
consider Neblo's work. See supra note 49; infra note 274.
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and a corresponding opinion-formation in a mobilized public sphere." 5 1 He
thinks we can only talk about "preferences" as what one "would express
after weighing the relevant information and arguments." '5 2 Addressing this
criterion, Fishkin invented his Deliberative Polls: "A deliberative opinion
poll models what the public would think, if it had a more adequate chance to
think about the questions at issue." 53 By taking seriously the extent to which
the voting public is uninformed and answers questions in public opinion
polls with very little serious consideration, Fishkin aims to create a
deliberative situation to cure these pathologies of mass democracy. The
primary task of the body is to arrive at a decision, keeping public concerns in
mind, all the while addressing individuals' private preferences. By
undergoing this kind of activity, not only will the participants become more
informed, but they will also take more seriously their role in public affairs. 5 4
To achieve these ends on a more general level, and not simply for the
.525 people who participate in the Polls, Fishkin tries to imagine what it
might mean "for the entire electorate to be so engaged in face-to-face
deliberation? As a thought experiment, we might imagine the sample being
replicated innumerable times with the same stimulus . . . until virtually

everyone is included."'5 5 This way of posing the deliberative situation
highlights its potential to serve as a better proxy for a deliberative and
representative public than our current legislative bodies. "Deliberative
polling is valuable precisely because it presents the voice not of experts or
pundits but of the people. And not as they are, but as they would be, having
learned more about the issues and had the opportunity of coming to a
considered judgment about them." 56 Thus, "[t]he ultimate point of such a
poll is prescriptive, not predictive. Its results have prescriptive force because
they are the voice of the people under special conditions where the people
have had a chance to think about the issues and hence should have a voice
worth listening to."'5 7 To be sure, there will be questions for which experts
will need to provide input. But there are too many questions that are left in
the hands of unaccountable judges and other elites; the people are competent
51. HABERMAS,supra note 12, at 362.
52. Id. at 336.
53. FISHKIN, DEMocRAcy AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 1.
54. This is not just speculation. Both Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8 and Button &
Mattson supra note 43 show results that bear out the thesis that deliberative situations make
citizens more likely to be interested (and to incite interest where it did not exist before) in
political affairs.
55. FISHKIN, DEMocRAcY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 84.
56. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8, at 6.
57. FisHtKiN, DEMOCRACY AND DELBtERATION,supra note 8, at 4.
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to answer many of these questions. Democracy should tend to prefer some
organized and thoughtful voice of the people, even if constraints will be
necessary to ensure that democracy can be trusted. This is one of the logics
for the separation of powers in the first place, and the people ought to be
mobilized to have a voice of their own, to have a power all their own.
Ultimately, I am more interested in the possibilities for direct democracy
than Fishkin. I share the standard suspicions of an excessively plebiscitary
model: 58 "It is a dubious accomplishment to give power to the people under
conditions where they are not really in a position to think about how they are
to exercise that power. ' 5 9 But wide use of Fishkin's procedure to derive
actual policy, not simply to disseminate information and garner public
opinion, should allay some of the obvious critiques of the referendum as a
poor instantiation of more direct democracy. As much as Habermas might
protest that every single citizen must take part in the discourses (though he
might not-we never really know what sorts of institutions would satisfy his
discourse-theoretic appetite), this condition is too unrealistic to take
seriously. Surely what he must mean is that every citizen must be
represented in a nonfictive sense. "Constitutional patriotism" and the
Supreme Court shouldn't be enough either. Thus, Fishkin's proxy not only
gives us a model for a reasonable approximation of injecting a level of
representative deliberation into government; radicalizing his Deliberative
Polls to be more institutionally intertwined with political mechanisms might
be a good way to bring about some of the goals that Habermas prizes like
legitimacy and an informed public sphere that can contribute to political
discourses.
As explored above in Part I, three major critiques of the standard
referendum and initiative processes are: (1) their propensity for poor and
biased turnout (a form of the voluntary response problem); (2) their
unacceptable reliance on moneyed interest groups; and (3) the problem that
results from the opacity of the statute under consideration. A radicalization
of Fishkin's methods for Deliberative Polls is poised to address each of these
problems. First, mandatory service with stratified random samples addresses
the lack of representativeness in direct democracy voters. Furthermore,
scrutiny of proposals over the course of a few days ensures getting past
sound-bite politics, thereby disempowering the forces swaying voters in
expensive media advertising campaigns. Last, plenary informational sessions
and research materials, as well as extended exploration in the small groups
58. See generally FisHIN, DEMocRAcY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 23;
HABERMAS, supra note 12.
59. FisnKiN, DEMocRAcY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 21.
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at the Deliberative Polls (with moderators trained to settle relevant questions
of fact), should ensure that people would at least comprehend the statutes
under consideration. Integrating deliberative assemblies into lawmaking
provides an opportunity for citizen input into decision-making processes,
without many of the shortcomings of the referendum and the initiative. To
be sure, my proposal leaves us with a whole host of carry-over and new
problems. My hope is to convince that the trade-off is worthwhile.
B. More Details
Let me summarize some of the salient features of Fishkin's model (and
my departures therefrom) that I would want to see used as a basis for the
mechanical implementation of my proposal.
1. Selecting Participants
The citizen juries are stratified random samples, chosen with a view
towards getting a broadly representative sample of the population at large.
Of course, the most immediate questions are: "Representative of whom more
specifically?" "Can I allow race-based representation? Class-based?
Occupation-based?" "Does strict demographic mirroring satisfy the demands
of scientific representativeness?" "Why ought I not embrace the jury model
which depends to a far greater extent on lotteries than on statistical
sampling, which may further entrench suspect classifications like race and
gender?" "Do I really think twelve percent of my participants being black
can sufficiently account for representing black interests?" These are
powerful questions (that are treated at length in their own literatures) that do
not yield obvious answers. As a general rule, however, Fishkin's sampling
does quite well against these sorts of objections because his samples tend to
reproduce initial preferences and demographic indicators in the larger pool
of public opinion. He demonstrates that his samples do generally reflect the
diversity of perspectives in society as a whole. I am not sure we can settle
the matter as a question of normative political theory. But institutionally,
this reform could effect some progress over current representative regimes in
terms of representation of minority interests. 60 In any event, it may simply

60. Magleby reports:
Lynn Baker has used public choice theory to explore the question of whether
minorities do better in representative institutions than in direct democracy. She
refutes "the claims that racial minorities are better served by representative than direct
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be true that there is no pre-formed political will that needs representation.
Providing the opportunities for deliberative assemblies is a way to create
informed political will. And representativeness results not because of who is
included, but because of how individuals are included. Deliberation without
the prospect for bargaining forces a particular sort of attention to the
question at hand.
Nonetheless, the problem of self-selection for Fishkin is as problematic
as he claims it is for town-hall meetings and call-in broadcasts. Asking
subjects to submit to deliberative situations is intimidating and timeintensive. Though he seems to have been successful at getting
"representative" samples, the kind of people who would agree to expose
themselves to a weekend of arguing surely causes a voluntary response
problem. My mandating participation skirts this problem. Even Fishkin, in
his less cautious moments, writes that the "role of delegate should be
considered analogous to that of juror. If this kind of event were eventually
institutionalized, it should come to be considered an obligation of
citizenship." 6 1 A most suggestive gesture indeed.
My selection process would be just as careful as Fishkin's and I would
recommend administering a pre-deliberative questionnaire, not to see if
people change their minds as Fishkin does, but to help ensure that a diversity
of perspectives are heard. If this condition is met, discussion in each of the
smaller groups could go in different directions even if the CCCA-like agency
could not plan the demographic representation in the smaller group, thereby
having too much substantive input on the direction of the deliberations.
Democratic practice in the public sphere must depend upon exposure to
some diversity of perspective and some expressions of self-interest, even if
enlightened. Though democracy might be a procedural practice that allows
private voting without discussion and majoritarian rule, surely a "strong"
democracy must demand more. The private vote was instituted to cure
certain ills with the public vote, which was the better theoretically-grounded
mechanism. But the private vote has pathologies of its own, shielding
citizens from one another, commodifying votes. The Popular branch is the
necessary corrective, because often hearing a (poor) person expressing his
own self-interest and its backstory is a way to change a mind. Democracies
law-making processes" and urges minorities to focus on ways to improve direct
democracy rather than abolish it.
Magleby, supra note 20, at 44 (citing Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination:
A Public Choice Perspective, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 707, 710 (1991)).
61. FlsuxiN, DEMocRAcY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 9.
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must allow (and even provide for) the capacity of the citizenry to change
their minds; that is its progressive, experimental, and pragmatist strain.
2. Competence and Moderating It
Fishkin's model also addresses "citizen competence." 62 The critics of
deliberative democracy rightly emphasize the degree to which citizens know
very little and are prone to defer to experts (or just yell unproductively at
one another), given the opportunity. 63 But this is no excuse for paternalism.
Fishkin puts his best foot forward not only by taking an "educative" stance
in helping citizens work through the issues with pamphlets and videos, 6 4 but
also by encouraging participation and carefully training moderators in social
psychology such that they do not let the big-mouths rule the floor. In his
polls, "80% of the participants spoke," "note-taking was common," and
"incivilities were rare." 6 5 Of course, critics of democracy throughout the
ages have stressed the degree to which democracy must be a rule by
demagogues. But those who run the Deliberative Polls are taught how to
diminish the effects of such a tendency. The moderators are, after all,
selected for their fairness and impartiality.
This suggests that we should perhaps recruit federal judges to moderate
as long as they undergo training by social psychologists to learn how to
control big-mouth lawyers trying to monopolize the discourse (though I
imagine they have most of the relevant training already). Even if a particular
judge's track record suggests partiality on a specific issue, most judges
would be usable as moderators who settle only questions of fact and
decorum. The moderators should be able to settle questions of fact for the
62. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8, at 7. See generally CTIzEN COMPETENCE AND
DEMocRAInc INsTrrTmONS (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999).
63. Button & Mattson, supra note 43.
64. The educational pamphlets in many states have not been a great success, but I
(unsurprisingly) think it relates to the fact that voters still have incentives for ignorance--this
is the well-known 'rational ignorance problem.' Flicking a lever one way or the other just
doesn't demand the energy necessary to get through hundreds of pages of explanation. My
more deliberative regime heightens expectations and incentives. Fishkin has noted that
participants often become much more engaged in politics in general when they know that they
will be part of his Deliberative Polls. A fortiori, I expect this reaction when their 1/n vote is a
substantial piece of the pie and not an infinitesimal, and their vote is expression of a will, not
merely an opinion.
65. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8, at 12. Since Fishkin's polls are not compulsory, he
likely gets a large number of talkers; the voluntary response problem suggests that he would
be likely to attract the talkative ones.
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jurors to help them in their deliberations, since many preferences are
obviously based on misinformation and misleading statistics. Since the
transcripts would be public, judges would not be able to get away with
steering conversation subtly. Impartiality will always be imperfect, but less
imperfect than in an oligarchy where money's voice rules and interest
groups are the only political force acting against politicians' self-interest in
preserving an over-class to reelect them. Subtle and controllable partiality is
66
better than corruption.
3. Breaking up the People to Get the Voice of the People
The discussions would take place in small groups of fifteen people with
thirty-five going on at once in the same location, all facilitated by (judicial)
moderators. To be sure, the basic briefing about the proposal and its history
could take place in a plenary session, but the deliberations proper would be
done on the micro level. This ensures that different routes of conversation
are explored and addresses Dahl's insight that there are "upper limits" to
effective participation. 6 7 Dahl estimates that 600 people can be part of a
68
general deliberative body, not so different from the number proposed here.
Surely, real discourse requires small sets of individuals, making Dahl's
"minipopulus" and deLeon's "PPA" undesireable. It also suggests that the
fad of arguing for electronic deliberation is mostly cyberblather: who ever
reads their mail from subscribed lists, especially those with 600 or more
subscribers?
4. Doctrine of Affected Interests
All 'stakeholder groups' affected by deliberation should be allowed
access to sway the direction of the body's deliberations. Of course, this is a
rather tricky condition because just who counts as a stakeholder will always
be in the hands of administrators (and civil societies as explored Part VI).
But even supposing an imperfect administration of justice, we can imagine
that many different perspectives could be considered over the course of a
few days. One way to address this particular concern would be to adopt a
voucher scheme, where all citizens (not only those selected for deliberation)
66. For a more lengthy treatment of possible corruptions of the Popular branch, see
infra Part IV.A.
67. See DAm., AFrER THE REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 54, 118; ROBERT A. DAHL &
EDWARD R. TuFrE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973).
68. See DELEON, supra note 6, at 32.
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get credits to allocate money towards interest groups working on their own
legislative reforms, providing extra help to the major advocates and
69
independents looking to publicize and organize their efforts.
5. No Gagging
I would be very hesitant to impose "gag rules" at the deliberations. 7 0 Jon
Elster notes that "an attempt to take an issue off the agenda is likely to place
it even more firmly on the agenda." 7 1 Moreover, what Fishkin's work shows
is that such rules are not necessary: "The mere fact that an assembly of
individuals defines its task as that of deliberation rather than mere forcebased bargaining exercises a powerful influence on the proposals and
arguments that can be made." 7 2 While people like Ackerman and Habermas
might aim for "constrained conversation," allowing for the admission of
only the 'Rational' or the 'Public-Spirited' in debate, I would remain
73
suspicious of such efforts.
In general, the attempt to police what people say in public forums is not
only unlikely to succeed anywhere off of a spaceship, but probably also has
bad implications for democratic practice. Why force someone to lie in public
if her opposition to same-sex marriage is biblically inspired? Why not just
push the person to question whether her biblical commitments are relevant to
the political question through the use of deliberation? Failure to change
someone's ideological commitments is not devastating. Failure to try by
shutting out the religious from the political public sphere is not only
revolting, but also stands in the way of progress.
C. Turning Yellow in the Face of ParticipatoryDemocracy
As helpful as these mechanics are for getting a sense of how to avoid
some of the obvious objections to the procedure, Fishkin ultimately
suppresses the tremendous potential of the deliberative situation he creates.
He exhibits a profound deference to our current modes of representation
69. This kind of finance reform is obviously in the spirit of Ackerman, supra note 36,
and gets a more extended treatment infra Part VI.
70. See Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules, in CONSTrnUnONA SM AND DEMOCRACY (Jon
Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1993).
71. ELsTER, supra note 43, at 16. For more on how gag rules in these kinds of forums
tend to be counterproductive empirically, Elster recommends looking at W.L. MILLER,
ARGUING ABoUT SLAvERY (1999).

72. ELSTER, supra note 43, at 100.
73. I will have more to say about this later. See infra Part V.
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because he is so suspicious of direct democracy. He only wants the
Deliberative Polls to be "initial evaluations" of potential candidates and was
initially interested in their ability to replace the disproportionate importance
of the primary elections in the early states.7 4 Concentration on major
elections diverts attention from part of the problem: politics will remain
spectatorial and voyeuristic if citizens see politics as sporting events
between major personalities. If issues and policies are to take center stage, it
would be more useful to have citizen debate about those things, not about
personalities or parties. This is why particular political personalities should
get marginalized in the Popular branch. To be sure, people and parties get
plenty of love in the other branches, so my inattention to them here should
not be seen as an oversight or as closing off the possibility for politics as
usual (or "normal politics" as Ackerman might have it).
Fishkin relies heavily upon the media to make his polls politically
important. 75 While the media's attention to the polls is critical, until such
time as the polls have direct impact on policy, coverage will only be possible
on PBS and C-SPAN. Results of a nationwide deliberative assembly on
affirmative action would run simultaneously on all three major networks,
much the way the State of the Union address does. Of course, citizens not
only would be allowed to keep their identities private, but all means
necessary should be taken to keep them private before and during the days of
deliberation to avoid the danger of their being manipulated, bribed, or
76
bombarded by interest-group or corporate haranguing and electioneering.
The Jefferson Center for New Democratic Processes in Minnesota has
proposed electoral juries of twelve-eighteen people who monitor presidential
campaigns to make public recommendations. They have also experimented
with "policy juries" that have grappled with such issues as the ethics of
organ transplants. 7 7 I think that these gestures are very hopeful and that we
should continue to look at what these juries decide so that we can convince
ourselves that lay people can be trusted to rule themselves in a larger
measure than they do now. 7 8 But none of these experimental situations has
its eye on the prize. I want to radicalize the use of these units and have them
74. FismjN, DEMOCRACY AND DELBERATION, supra note 8, at 8, 96.
75. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8, at 5. After all, Habermas has called the media the
"fourth branch."
76. For more on the difficulties of privacy and publicity, see infra Part IV.B.
77. FismKm, DEMOcRAcY AND DIBERATION, supra note 8, at 97.
78. On the issue of jury competence, the empirical research and the literature is quite
heartening even if many non-democrats would like to do away with them for normative
considerations. See infra Part IV.G.
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engaged in actual institutionalized decision-making about policies, not about
politics. Until they are so engaged, they will embody many of the
pathologies of deliberation (like deference to experts) without providing for
any of the benefits (like more legitimacy and more civic virtue). To employ
a Habermasian distinction, in a functioning republic, "opinion-formation" is
only one aspect of lawmaking. For law to emanate from the civic voice of
the people, nonfictive "will-formation" should be central. The way of
achieving nonfictive will-formation is through deliberative procedures aimed
79
at forming a will instead of an opinion.
Fishkin is correct to commend Dahl for getting us thinking about how
time will always constrain deliberation. 80 "Time always matters when a
decision has to be made." 8 1 So, there is no reason to lament that we will
have to vote at the end of the sessions. In fact, it is testimony in service of
the claim here that deliberation must always be about doing something
ultimately, 82 something some ideal proceduralists seem to deny in requiring
a logically complete argument. And what thinking about time also brings to
the foreground is why we should reject Dahl and deLeon's suggestions
because asking citizens to take a year out of their lives is simply too
intrusive. I appeal only to common sense here.
79. See Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, in NEW FRENCH
THOUGHT: PoImcAL PHILOSOPHY 186-200 (Mark Lilla ed., Elly Stein & Jane Mansbridge
trans., 1994) (1987) (depending completely on deliberative will-formation as the only source
of legitimacy for a republic). Obviously, I do not follow Manin in his monolithic treatment of
deliberation, but it is a very important paper in the literature and it delivers a very good
argument for deliberation's importance in will-formation. It is also sensitive to Habermasian
extremes, taking the more reasonable view (against Habermas's seeming need for unanimous
consensus in discursive practices) that "given the appropriate procedural rules for
deliberation, the better argument is simply the one that generates more support and not the one
that is able to convince all participants." Id. at 200. For more on this distinction, see infra Part
V. But see MUELLER, supra note 32, at 180-87 (arguing that if consensus is implausible, the
appropriate second-best is attaining a supermajority, not merely a majority).
80. FIsHuN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 37.
81. ELSTER, supra note 43, at 6.
82. Aristotle's comments on deliberation figure here relevantly. See ARISTOTLE,
NIcOmACHEAN ETics 11 12a13-1113a15 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985) (arguing that "by 'open
to deliberation,' presumably, we should mean what someone with some sense, not some fool
or madness, might deliberate about"). Aristotle also argues that:
no one deliberates about eternal things . . . rather, we deliberate about what results
through our agency .. . where the outcome is unclear and the right way to act is
undefined. And we enlist partners in deliberation on large issues when we distrust our
own ability to discern [the right answer]. We deliberate not about ends, but about
what promotes ends.
Id. at 1112a23-1112b13.
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Even Habermas is aware that "the actual course of [deliberative] debates
deviates from the ideal procedure of deliberative politics." 83 In fact, he goes
further when he claims that the whole concept of the ideal speech situation is
a "methodological fiction": "Even under favorable conditions, no complex
society could ever correspond to the model of purely communicative
relations. ' 84 Habermas keeps us talking about ideal conditions, however,
because "presuppositions of rational discourse have a steering effect on the
course of debate." 8 5 If this is true, theorists still deserve some attention to
help us craft a better version of deliberation. But too often they get caught
up worrying about ideal conditions without giving attention to plausible ones
that would help them achieve their goal of a more deliberative republic. I
will turn to theory in Part V to see if I can make realistic some of the ideal
conditions that occasionally do more to constrain deliberation than to steer
it. But first I will commit some pages to integrating my Popular branch into
the separation of powers (Part III) and then meeting some objections to my
institutional deliberative assemblies (Part IV).

m.

SEPARATION OF POWERS: WHY AND How

My deliberative assemblies must evoke images of Thomas Jefferson's
imagined ward system: "'[D]ivide the counties into wards.' Thus Jefferson
once summed up an exposition of his most cherished political idea, which,
alas, turned out to be as incomprehensible to posterity as it had been to his
contemporaries." 86 In essence, Jefferson saw wards, small political debating
assemblies, as building blocks for the republic. The ward was a place where
each person could educate himself in political matters, a place "where every
man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic ... and feels that he is a
participator in the government of affairs, not merely at an election one day in
the year, but every day." 87 Though stressing the educative function of small
local forums for deliberation among citizens, Jefferson also invoked a
participatory ideal, emphasizing citizen input and activity as central to a
functioning large-scale republic: "the absence of such a subdivision of the
83

HABERMAS, supra

note 12, at 340.

84. Id. at 326.
85. Id. at 340.

86. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 252 (1965) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 1381 (Library of America ed., 1984) (in a letter to John Cartwright on June 5,
1824)).
87.

JEFFERSON, supra

note 86, at 1380, cited in

KEVIN MArrSON,

CREATING A

DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC: THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY DURING THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 3-4 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 33 Rutgers L.J. 388 2001-2002

2002]

A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH

88
country constitute[s] a vital threat to the very existence of the republic."
But the wards were not conceived as vehicles to be utilized strictly for the
power inherent in localism and the mobilization that is more easily
facilitated by ward organizing; they were conceived as citizenship-enhancing
for the State at large.
Jefferson appealed to his wards to instantiate a truer "gradation of
authorities, standing each on the basis of law, holding every one its
delegated share of powers, and constituting truly a system of fundamental
balances and checks for the government." 89 Since he acknowledged that
some (even if not all) sovereignty resides within the people, providing the
demos a forum in which they could act as sovereign was fitting to a
democracy. Moreover, popular power might be

the only remed[y] against the misuse of public power .... Jefferson, though
the secret vote was still unknown at the time, had at least a foreboding of how
dangerous it might be to allow the people a share in public power without
providing them at the same time with more public space than the ballot box
90
Jefferson had in mind what Montesquieu already knew, "that only 'power
arrests power,' that is we must add, without destroying it, without putting
impotence in the place of power." 9 1 Like these thinkers (without taking a
place among them, of course), I add to the separation of powers instead of
scaling back and reforming by removing power, making other legislative
bodies impotent in the face of direct democracy. Though Jefferson was no
Federalist, his ward system could be administered and integrated into the
separation of powers framework.
Yet, although Jefferson felt that it was critical to "break[] up 'the many'
into assemblies where everyone could count and be counted upon," he
"remained curiously silent" about the "specific functions" of his "elementary
republics. ' 9 2 Surely my proposal offers a flavor of what it might look like to
have "the many" broken up into assemblies with a "gradation of authority,"
taking quite seriously the practice of the separation of powers. This Part is
88. ARENDT, supra note 86, at 249.
89. JEFFERSON, supra note 86, at 1380, 1399 (in letters to John Cartwright on June 5,
1824 and to Samuel Kercheval on July 12, 1816).
90. ARENDT, supra note 86, at 253.
91.

Id. at 151 (citing CHAR.m-Louis DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE

LAWS 155-56 (Anne Cohler et al. trans. & ed., 1989) (1748)).
92. Id. at 254.
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devoted to fleshing out, in a more meaty fashion than I have yet done, how
my fourth branch should interact with the other three.
A. Non-Revolutionary Transition? Thinking Through Arendt
But first I want to emphasize that my elaboration of Jefferson's thoughtexperiment can be integrated cleanly, despite Hannah Arendt's insistence in
On Revolution that Jefferson's council system is necessarily revolutionary,
citing the wards' anticipation of the Soviets and Riite. 93 Arendt struggles to
read the ward system--and its possibilities for citizenship and revivification
of public space-as an entirely new form of government that remained
unrealized even by the American Revolution, at least partly because such a
system is too revolutionary. For her, even if not for Jefferson, the ward
system stakes a public space where citizens can discover and practice their
civic public freedom. Such deliberative forums create the possibility for
public happiness, a form of flourishing that seems nostalgic, if only because
flourishing seems like Greek to us. Ironically this nostalgia, for Arendt, is
altogether constitutive of the revolutionary spirit.
Thus, she claims that Jefferson knew that his 'imagined community' was
too revolutionary. She deems it "noteworthy that we find no mention of the
ward system in any of Jefferson's formal works, and it may be even more
important that the few letters in which he wrote of it with such emphatic
insistence all date from the last period of his life."'9 4 Jefferson, she claims,
gives us a hint to the councils' meaning by never spelling out their purpose
formally:
This vagueness of purpose, far from being due to a lack of clarity, indicates
perhaps more tellingly than any other single aspect of Jefferson's proposal
that the afterthought in which he clarified and gave substance to his most
cherished recollections from the Revolution in fact concerned a new form of
government rather than a mere reform of it or a mere supplement to the
95
existing institutions.
Of course, this Part suggests that the adoption of a Popular branch is in a
sense a mere reform, a mere supplement to existing institutions. But it may
have revolutionary effects; it may cause a paradigm shift. Nonetheless, this
Part stresses that the proposal can be integrated into the separation of powers
93. Id. at 252.
94. Id. at 253.
95. Id. at 258.
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framework with small reforms, without a violent and destructive campaign
for revolutionary change: "It would be tempting to spin out further the
potentialities of the councils, but it certainly is wiser to say with Jefferson,
'Begin them only for a single purpose; they will soon show for what others
they are the best instruments.' 9 6 I take this same strategy by emphasizing
the degree to which a reform in the separation of powers is all that is
necessary. What may follow from such a shift is for a normative
conversation elsewhere.
1. Arendt and the Problems of Self-Selection in the Public Sphere
Yet, there is more to say about Arendt because her reading makes clearer
how the Popular branch is not Jeffersonian, if she reads Jefferson right.
First, she praises Jefferson's vision for its aristocratic implications,
implications that are easily avoided in my reform plan. Arendt claims
(approvingly, I think) that using ward-republics as a form of government
would spell the end of general suffrage as we understand it today; for only
those who as voluntary members of an 'elementary republic' have
demonstrated that they care for more than their private happiness and are
concerned about the state of the world would have the right to be heard in the
97
conduct of the business of the republic.
Of course, as I continue to emphasize, participation in my 'wardrepublics,' or deliberative assemblies, would not be voluntary, and thus
would avoid Arendt's depiction of the form of government as aristocratic.
She doesn't mind self-selection in politics because she cares to "give
substance and reality to one of the most important negative liberties we have
enjoyed since the end of the ancient world, namely, freedom from
politics."' 98 In my possible world, freedom and legitimacy take precedence
for a few days in a citizen's lifetime over the negative liberty to be free from
politics. To be sure, Arendt always draws our attention to "the paradox that
99
freedom is the fruit of necessity."

96.
and 89).
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 283 (citing letters from Jeffersonto Cartwright and Kercheval, supra notes 86
Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 54.
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2. The Party Problem
In Arendt's rendering of councils that spring up spontaneously during
revolutionary episodes, the wards fundamentally "challenge[] the party
system as such, in all its forms, and this conflict [is] emphasized whenever
the councils, born of revolution, turn[] against the party or parties whose
sole aim [is] always [] the revolution." 100 She insists that "[it is indeed in
the very nature of the party system to replace 'the formula "government of
the people by the people" by this formula: "government of the people by an
,lite sprungfrom the people."' 10 1 Using the Russian Revolution as her proof
of "the incompatibility of the.., councils with the party system," 10 2 Arendt
never takes seriously the possibility of integration because she is so
committed to the councils' revolutionary impulse.
Her reading has its insight, however: if parties cannot control the
deliberations and agenda of the councils, they are sure to feel disempowered
and will try to fight for their dissolution. But formal integration, a separation
of powers, might tranquilize the concerns of each locus of power, stabilizing
the incompatibility that Arendt diagnoses in the party-council tension. This
Part, then, will also be sensitive to the fact that the American regime that we
take for granted as one with a separation of powers between branches is just
as much a "party democracy." 10 3 In this vein, Arendt writes: "If we were to
classify contemporary regimes according to the power principle upon which
they rest, the distinction between the one-party dictatorships and the multiparty systems would be revealed as much less decisive than the distinction
that separates them both from the two-party systems." 104 Though I have no
intention of combing the political science literature to substantiate Arendt's
claim here, it should remain obvious that if the Popular branch becomes
institutionalized, political parties can be involved in the Popular branch
without corrupting it. Perhaps, modern American parties "cannot be
regarded as popular organs," and might instead be "the very efficient
instruments through which the power of the people is curtailed and
100. Id. at 269.
101.
Id. at 281 (citing MAURICE DUVERGER, PoLmcAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION
AND AcTivrrY INTHE MODERN STATE 425 (Barbara & Robert North trans., 1954) (1951)).
102. ARENDT, supra note 86, at 261.
103. The term is taken from BERNARD MANN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE
GovERNmENT 193-235 (1997). I do not stay strictly within Manin's categories: America
clearly has aspects of "Parliamentarianism" and "audience democracy" as well. But his
insistence that the two-party system alters the separation of powers is critical in any attempt to
integrate a "non-partisan" branch into the regime.
104. ARENDT, supra note 86, at 272.
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controlled." 10 5 But by forcing them to pander to the thoughtful deliberations
of ordinary citizens, the people can reclaim some power without destroying
parties even if they are forced to become more responsive. Arendt claims
that the "historical truth of the matter is that the party and council systems
are almost coeval." 106 I am trying to make them consistent without arevolution. After all, "a separation of powers, far from causing impotence,
10 7
generates and stabilizes power."
B. Some HistoricalIllumination: Progressionfrom the Progressives?
Jefferson's imagined ward system was not just a thought experiment. It
came closest to a reality during the Progressive Era. And the Progressives'
failures with their "ward-republics" can be instructive precisely because they
failed to integrate their voluntary groups in any systematic way. By avoiding
the task of finding a coherent way to absorb their councils into preexisting
governmental units, their assemblies fell prey to partisan influence,
destroying their capacity to help form a popular will. Though they were
successful on some educational grounds, they failed to form a new site for
political expression because they became slaves to politics.
The Progressive Era is known for its "bold political
experimentation," 10 8 with its major legacy to the modem republic being
various institutions of direct democracy, like the initiative, the referendum,
and the recall. Though the initiative and referendum enjoy widespread use in
many states even today, the Progressive Era also saw the flourishing of a
different form of direct democracy. Citizens in the decades before World
War I met in town assemblies for public deliberations about pressing issue
of the day. These evening meetings were well-attended by all classes of the
population as well as those of differing political affiliations, and were often
organized and funded with public resources.
1. Zueblin
Charles Zueblin, a notable leader of the movement for deliberative
assemblies in the Progressive Era, was self-consciously "search[ing] for
institutions where citizens could reengage in politics within the setting of the
modern, urban world." He was decidedly not "harking back to an abstract
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 271.
MATTSON, supra

note 87, at 7.
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ideal of ancient citizens" (even if Arendt and I are).1 ° 9 Zueblin, with his
concurrent involvement in city beautification efforts, was a social engineer
engaged in the very Arendtian task of reclaiming public space for politics,
but without polis envy. Yet, although Zueblin was brought into the
deliberative fold by spending time in Jane Addams's social settlement, Hull
House, he decided to concentrate on the educative virtues associated with
deliberation. Instead of following Addams, who "tried to set up forums
where immigrant and working-class citizens debated the issues of the
day," 1 10 Zueblin created forums where adults from all backgrounds could
achieve higher levels of education, and with that, a greater capacity to
engage in politics. He started university extension programs because he
"looked upon the urban college as the leader in democratic political
education," and put most of his energy from 1891 to 1908 into this
111
enterprise.
Ironically, Zueblin saw university extension as an antidote to the
prevalence of professionalism in the nation's schools at the time, which were
trying to "embrace[] the German model of education." 112 Of course, thi s is
ironic only because our nation's extension schools are nothing but forums
for professional training. But insofar as they aim to reach a broader clientele
and are thus often less 'academic,' they are partially consistent with
Zueblin's vision. Nonetheless, when we consider what university extension
took as its inspiration, it is only laughable to see how distant 'adult
education' is from Zueblin's hopes for it: He wanted to revivify a form of
lecture circuit that Ralph Waldo Emerson made famous. Yet, "[bly the
1880s the lyceum lecture system, an important nineteenth-century popular
institution that once cultivated middle-class civility, had fully degenerated
1 13
into commercial entertainment."
If Zueblin really wished to recreate Emerson's effect on the public, it is
no surprise that he failed. Though he was also looking to accomplish a feat
of class-mixing, contending with lecturers' condescension proved too
difficult. Preserving the student-teacher relationship in the context of
deliberation proved disastrous, only confirming what I have emphasized
here, that taking the educative aspects of deliberation too seriously works
against the democratic possibilities for participatory politics. But perhaps
even more demeaning to Zueblin's enterprise was the fact that his forums
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 25.
id. at 23.
id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
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became too political: speakers took vigorous stands on issues of the day;
since the speakers had an uncontested podium, their authority was not
challenged in an even-handed manner. To be sure, university resistance to
the project may have been motivated more by fear of upsetting funders than
by concern for academic integrity and unpoliticized knowledge.
Nonetheless, in either case, Zueblin's hopes for participation via education
1 14
remained unrealized.
2. Howe and Johnson
Frederic Howe, a trained political scientist from Johns Hopkins
University, also got involved in participatory politics, and with his political
training avoided many of Zueblin's mistakes. Howe went 'into the trenches'
with his political knowledge, getting involved with the famous anticorporate mayor of Cleveland, Tom Johnson. By fighting for Johnson's
progressive policies in city government and as a state senator, Howe tried to
help reform the political system from within its very institutions, moving
beyond Zueblin's extra-political attempts to establish a new space for
politics. Thus, Howe's strategy was to embrace "democratic self-government
and decentralization ... hand in hand." 1 15 Howe looked to instantiate
Jefferson's dream of the ward-republic, rallying behind Tom Johnson's ward
which lived by the following motto: "Vital questions will not be left to the
decision of the executive and council alone. They will come directly before
1 16
the people."
Of course, the rhetoric of sending vital issues to the people at the ballot
box is commonplace even to those that live outside of California. And
though first established by the Progressives to combat corporate power over
the political process, the initiative and referendum have notoriously become
just the opposite: campaigns are so costly as to be affordable only to the
most moneyed interests. 1 17 Johnson, however, proved his prescience by
making direct democracy less commodified; he would not allow it to be a
process of jostling for private votes. Instead, he felt that "heckling is the
most valuable form of political education," so wanted to make direct

114. Id. at 28-29.
115. Id. at35.
116. Tom Johnson, The Ideal City, SATURDAY EvENING POST, November 9, 1901, at 1,
cited in MATTSON, supra note 87, at 36.
117. See generally DAVID BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS
AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000).

HeinOnline -- 33 Rutgers L.J. 395 2001-2002

396

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:359

democracy partake of heckling. 1 18 To this end, he was interested in ways to
foster "collective discussion."' 119 He gained fame, then, by instituting tent
meetings for the electorate to air its concerns. Johnson knew that the lecture
hall wasn't the right forum to ignite public discussion, so created large
picnics where urbanites could meet in an agora-esque environment and talk
about politics (once they got past taking note of the weather).
But Johnson had an element of condescension in his program as well:
"Johnson wrote: 'The chief part of our program in Cleveland was to educate
the people never to be indifferent."', 120 Focusing on education has its
disadvantages insofar as it provides a podium for educators to impress upon
the uneducated with uncontested political ideas. Such a fixation also allows
too-sharp a separation of the educative aspects of deliberation and willformation: "Johnson occasionally ignored the democratic public he helped
initiate . . . .Worse yet, he tried to block the referendum that eventually
defeated him." 12 1 For Johnson, progressive politics took priority over
democratic processes, a sure-fire way to undermine the ideal of popular
sovereignty.
Howe, however, knew that keeping the popular forums at the level of
civil society, apart from direct action upon the state, would be sure to hinder
their ability to be efficacious mechanisms for democracy. He placed firm
belief in the discursive inspiration that referenda could effect, but was well
aware that public opinion needed to be refined for legislation to be liberal, as
opposed to just democratic. Such a desire for refining political public
opinion led Howe to the People's Institute of New York, founded in 1897.
The Institute "became famous for its 'People's Forum' [where] a lecturer
spoke typically to about one thousand people, and a question-answer period
followed." 12 2 Initially taking the form of Zueblin's experiment with adult
education, the Forum became overtly political, self-consciously taking on
legislative issues. 12 3 After the meetings, those present would vote on
resolutions that "were then sent to city council representative ...Sometimes
politicians directly addressed the People's Forum. Eventually, activists at the
People's Institute, including Howe, started up other local forums throughout

118.
119.
120.
MAGAZINE,
121.
122.
123.

TOM JOHNSON, MY STORY 82 (1911), cited in MATTSON, supra note 87, at 37.
Id.at 39.
Id.at 38 (citing Tom Johnson, My Fight Against a Three-Cent Fare, HAMPTON'S
Sept. 1911, at 373).
MATTSON, supra note 87, at 39.
Id.at 41.
Id.
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New York City." 12 4 Howe's involvement in this enterprise helped focus the
forum on political action, not merely education or discussion. In the early
days of the Forums, they successfully avoided becoming politicized and
remained public spaces for citizen participation and action. "[R]egular
citizens were given a chance to hear one another deliberate as public actors
12 5
and see themselves as equals to intellectuals."
Howe led the People's Institute for approximately three years prior to
1915, when he became the Commissioner of Immigration. But his
contributions provided a legacy: with Howe's leadership, George Coleman
founded the Ford Hall Forum in Boston in 1908, a forum that had Zueblin as
a regular speaker. 12 6 Indeed, by 1916, "about one hundred forums" existed
in New England alone, with many more sprouting in the West and the
South. 127
But Howe was not quite a model leader for the forums, even if he was
representative. Or, better, he fell prey to the standard Progressive misuse of
the deliberative assembly:
[HJis control could become anti-democratic at times. Although he believed in
a democratic public, Howe's role as a political activist occasionally caused
him to envision the forum as a tool for political reform ....
At times [] Howe
admired the forum less for its democratic initiative and more for its use-value
12 8
for reformers."
Howe, like Johnson his mentor, could not integrate his deliberative
creation without taking advantage of its potential for manipulation and
political partisanship.
3. Rochester
Among the most famous of deliberative fora were the products of the
social center movement centered in Rochester, New York. Avoiding partisan
leanings by getting the endorsement of the two parties as well as the
Progressive Party, the Rochester social debate clubs provided the greatest
hope for class-mixing and political action. Because the social center
movement realized that public resources could be cultivated, by 1912 it
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.at 44.
Id. at 46.
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made its own effort to integrate itself into the public sphere. As tax dollars
paid for schools, organizers petitioned to use schools in the evenings for
their gatherings, tying the centers directly to public funds, and therewith, to
public policy. Topics debated included "direct primaries, 'race relations,'...
women's suffrage, 'public health as a political issue,' labor union politics,
' 129 Most
and America's continued foreign policy in the Philippines."
importantly, however, "citizens themselves set the agenda" instead of
professors or possibly biased organizers. 13 0 And funding was only
contingent upon popular participation: "[I]f attendance at a social center
during one evening fell below twenty-five people, funds were cut."' 13 1 This
condition ensured that the contents of the meeting were not censored with
the power of the purse.
But there were two severe problems with the social centers: one was a
kink in the philosophy of the clubs and the other was a structural
disadvantage. An example of a philosophical problem can be detected in one
132
club's "constitutional preamble:"
Whereas, the world needs men and women, who can think clearly and
express their thought well; and whereas, each of us has powers of clear
thinking and good expression which need only practice for development;...
we whose names are hereunto annexed, do form a society whose object shall
be the cultivation of the powers of clear thinking and good expression by
133
means of debates, essays, orations, public readings and discussions.
By making eloquence the main virtue of the clubs, the possibility for the
success of the clubs as a site for politics was necessarily curtailed. If the
clubs assembled to help members become better public speakers, the clubs
were bound to become mere play-acting in a theatrical environment, trailers
that were only teasers for the real policy discussions going on elsewhere.
The structural problem with the social centers was its voluntary nature.
Even though "twenty-five percent of the registration for the clubs during
1910 came from working-class immigrants or 'non-English speaking
persons,' as reported in the Democrat and Chronicle," the clubs could not
129. Id. at 57. Mattson cites original agenda entries from the City of Rochester's
records of proceedings.
130. Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
131.
132. Id. at 55.
133. Herbert West, Citizenship and the Evening Use of School Buildings II, NEw
BOSTON 530 (Apr. 1911) (cited in MArSON, supra note 87, at 55).
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13 4
help but represent only the particular interests of those that came forward.
To be sure, the social centers achieved high levels of attendance, but their
capacity for representation in any sense (substantial, electoral, or socialscientific) was suspect. Although the clubs were successful at "breaking
down the hegemony of America's two-party system" by giving equal airtime
to the Socialists and Prohibitionists, there was never a formal guarantee that
13 5
any standard of representativeness was being met.
The social centers, unsurprisingly, also met a grim fate. Organized
religion saw them as anarchic for not having chaperons and used their pull
with political elites to bring down the 'social' movement. Political elites
themselves felt threatened (just as Arendt would have predicted) and pulled
funding. Journalists worried that speakers were having an unacceptable sway
on those that could not think and speak for themselves. 13 6 And by the time
World War I got underway, the social centers, already in decline, were used
ideologically to mobilize popular opinion instead of being used to help
37
measure it. 1

4. The Need for Integration
Participatory democracy in the Progressive Era had its attractions:
"Before announcing his independent Progressive Party candidacy, Theodore
Roosevelt [argued] that the social center should become the 'Senate of the
people.' 13 8 And in the 1920s, "Clarence Perry argued that the major goal of
the social centers had been 'the dissolution of class and racial
antagonism.' 13 9 Noticing that in the social centers "the president of the
Women's Christian Temperance Union and a Polish washwoman found
themselves debating a college professor and a day cleaner ' 14 0 lends
credence to the view that at least some of the goals of class-mixing were
temporarily fulfilled in this context.
But, in the final analysis, the Progressive attempt to found wardrepublics failed precisely because they were never systematized and
integrated into the separation of powers; they were always a site of
134.
135.
136.
at 60-62.
137.
138.
139.
MOVEMENT

140.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Each of these attacks on the social centers is chronicled by Mattson in detail. Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 70 (citing CLARENCE
4 (1921)).
Id.

PERRY, TEN YEARS OF THE COMMUNITY CENTER

HeinOnline -- 33 Rutgers L.J. 399 2001-2002

400

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:359

mobilization or education, and never contributed systematically to forming
and measuring a representative popular will. These lessons were learned the
hard way, but their errors are avoidable.
C. Doing the Integration:Mixing It Up
Let us get back to the business of institutional design. Bernard Manin
traces the roots of popular assemblies very far back indeed, and notes that
even "in the so-called 'direct democracies' of the ancient world-Athens, in
particular-the popular assembly was not the seat of all power. Certain
important functions were performed by other institutions."' 14 1 A standard of
competence was preserved for a set of magistracies even if most public
officials were selected by lottery. 14 2 Notable, and often neglected, is the fact
that even the lottery system in Athens was voluntary: anyone could opt out
and choose not to serve his polis. 14 3 This yielded a populism that had an
aristocratic element built in, precisely the diagnosis Arendt notices about the
potential for Jefferson's imagined republic.
But perhaps the most important feature of a mixed regime-a regime
that embodies populist and oligarchic, democratic and aristocratic
tendencies-is exactly its mixed quality. Well-mixed regimes were clearly
on the mind of our first institutional designers, the American Founders, who
144
were thinkers with a "slightly comical erudition in political theory:"
"Aristotle thought that, by synthesizing democratic and oligarchic
arrangements, one obtained a better constitution than regimes that were all
of a piece. Various combinations of lot, election, and property qualifications
allowed just this kind of synthesis."' 14 5 Aristotle had his own proposals for
appropriate mixtures of regimes, ones that are repugnant to our more liberal
sensibilities. But Montesquieu, closer to our liberal hearts, continued the
tradition of investigating mixed regimes, leaving us satisfied that the mixed
regime is not antithetical to the liberal enterprise. The mixed nature always
contributes to stability in much the same way that the separation of powers
does. By allowing flexibility and cross-breeding within his typology of
regimes, Montesquieu was able to germinate the idea of the separation of
powers. And the familiar path from Montesquieu to the Founders need not
141. MANIN, supra note 103, at 5.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 16 (citing MONTESQuIEU, supra note 91, at 10-15).
144. ARENDT, supra note 86, at 117.
145. MANIN, supra note 103, at 27 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLmics 1294b1 1-14; 1300a8b5 (Carnes Lord trans. & ed., 1984)).
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be retraced. England's constitutional monarchy, to cite the most obvious
example, only confirms that progressive democratization does not
necessarily mean 'power to the people.' What it has meant is a rejection of
the indivisibility of sovereignty, an appreciation that sovereignty can reside
in more than one site of the exercise of political power. It is to oppose Bodin
14 6
and Hobbes on principle.
Among the various possibilities for a mixed regime is what we have
now: "The mixed constitution was defined as a mix of monarchical,
aristocratic (or oligarchic), and democratic elements, the combination of
which was seen as the cause of its astonishing stability. Leaving aside the
monarchical dimension, election, could, by analogy, be termed a mixed
institution." 14 7 As Manin notes, election embodies both a democratic
element and an oligarchic one, reminding us that the terms election and elite
have the same etymology. 14 8 Montesquieu had already insisted that
selection by lot is democratic while selection by vote is aristocratic (in
contrast to Arendt's typology). 149 Though Manin is rightfully frustrated that
Montesquieu does not really give a good sense of why this is so, he
concedes, as we must, that it does not need philosophical explanation when
the empirical facts, at least in America's representative system, bear out the
aristocratic nature of our modem form of electoral representation. The
linguistic facts present their own evidence: "in a number of languages the
same adjective denotes a person of distinction and a person who has been
'15 0
chosen [by vote]."
But an obvious counterpoise to the aristocratic nature of electoral
representation is an implementation of my proposal for Popular direct
democracy. Though Joseph Schumpeter was undoubtedly onto something
when he suggested that the people have no preformed political will prior to
political contest, 15 1 there is no normative reason to settle for the

146.
and Hobbes
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 45 (arguing that "[i]t was in opposition to [mixed government] that Bodin
developed the modem theory of indivisible sovereignty").
Id. at 155.
Id. at 140.
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 91, at 13.
MANIN, supra note 103, at 140.
See generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

(1942). In this context, Riker argues that populism "depends on the existence of popular will
discovered by voting. But, if voting does not reveal a will, if the people speak in meaningless
tongues, populism as a concept is rendered quite empty." RUCER, supra note 15, at 239. Of
course, providing deliberative fora for genuine will-formation and expression would prove
populism's very assumption: that people can, if given. the right conditions, express a will.
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Schumpeterian nightmare. Instead, we can think about how to put to use a
lottery system, an idea that the Founders knew about but never took the time
to consider seriously. 15 2 Endorsing my proposal caters to Madison and the
Federalists by keeping in place independent representatives that are trustees
of the public, but it also appeases the anti-Federalists by separating the
power of Congress from a new power vested 3in an institution designed to
15
represent the people's likeness more directly.
As a prefatory remark, in this context, I only discuss the American case,
making the specifics of integration more explicit. In the American system,
there is already a relaxing of the three-branch system: the administrative
agencies or the media are often known as fourth branches. And Californiastyle democracy is surely less Madisonian than a strict three-branch system
would necessitate. So I feel I am on a trodden path. Even apart from the
American governmental case, I am committed to my institution's portability
and think it could find a rightful place in other democratic regimes. I do not
bother here, however, with the comparative work that would spell out the
details of a Popular branch's role in a parliamentary regime (i.e., England) or
in a direct democratic regime (i.e., Switzerland) because I do not have any
expertise that would make such work valuable. Moreover, I hope that
specialists in institutional design projects in international governance or
workplace democracy might also see a clean way of integrating the basic
structure of a Popular branch into those forms of organization, even
supposing that the checks and balances would need to be calibrated
differently in each case. But the essence remains the same: in addition to the
representative structures necessary for organizing large groups of people, the
people still need a forum for will-formation where they can be the authors of
their laws.

Riker's mistake is to fixate on voting, which need not be the only forum for popular political
expression.
152. MANIN, supra note 103, at 80.
153. For a summary of the Anti-Federalist arguments about the need for likeness in
representation ("descriptive representation" in the phrase of HANNA FENICHEL PrrKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967)), see MANIN, supra note 103, at 109. But this is
surely not the place to treat the ever-expanding literature on theories of representation. In
some respects my proposal takes a very definite position, and the entire proposal risks being
rejected on the basis of its notion of representation alone. Nonetheless, I will have to defer the
lengthy defense for another time.
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1. The Legislative Errors that Call for Popular Action
There are two main types of communicational errors that call for popular
input into the separation of powers within a representative democracy. Both
surface as gaps between public opinion and those representing its interests
(even if representatives are not agents but trustees of public opinion). In one
instance, the people may be mobilized on an issue that representatives refuse
to discuss in a meaningful way. An example of such a gap may be the case
of health management organizations: since the corporations give so much
money to both parties, inaction in legislatures often results even though there
is mass popular mobilization for reform in the arena of health insurance. In
another pathological instance, legislatures may be mystified on an issue,
unable to find a reasonable compromise. In these cases, legislatures might
want to consult the electorate directly, for fear of acting unilaterally. But
often pollsters and pundits are in cahoots, making the gauging of public
opinion unreliable.
Of course, the obvious structural correctives for these gaps are the
initiative in the first instance and the referendum in the second. But this
proposal rejects the standard model of direct democracy looking to replace it
with a Popular branch, utilizing the idea of a Popular initiative and a
Popularreferendum. Without rehearsing all the details of how each of these
measures of direct democracy function, I will briefly explain how each of
these functions would be adapted by the Popular branch and how the
processes would be integrated into our current mixed regime, which could
be mixed up a little further.
At this stage I risk being too specific: all of the details in what follows
are just suggestions for how to put my proposal into effect and may not take
account of every possible case that could arise. Yet, I refuse to leave the
integration of my branch into the separation of powers too vague.
Accordingly, let me take two bills through my proposed fourth branch, and
then address the role of the Executive and the Judiciary more directly before
I make a brief comment about political parties.
Imagine a possible world where health-insured voters were fed up with
health insurance companies. Imagine the citizens of this possible world
frustrated by the legislature's unwillingness to take action against insurance
companies because interested corporations fund campaigns. And imagine the
further frustration associated with lobbyists' inability to provide incentives
or disincentives to the representatives to reform the health insurance system.
To whom can the people turn?
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With a fourth branch, organizers in civil society could collect signatures
to take action themselves. 15 4 Political consultants would be hired, and
experts would be consulted. A bill, call it P1, would be drafted without state
intervention. P1 would need to be confined to eight double-spaced pages
with one-inch margins, using only 12-point Times New Roman font.
Signature collecting firms and volunteers would be enlisted to try to reach
the threshold number of signatures required to get the bill before the
administrative agency. A major dissemination campaign would get
underway. The relevant statewide or national commission detailed in Part I
(CCCA) would then review the signatures collected, as well as review the
15 5
wording of P1.
At that stage, the Commission could kill the bill for procedural
infractions on behalf of those bringing the initiative before the body.
Signature falsification, pork-barreling, or other decidedly unkosher
corruptive tactics would be a good enough reason to kill a bill, forcing the
special interest funding the initiative campaign to start over. Frivolous or
dilatory bills could also be stopped by the Commission, though only a
majority vote by the nine members of the Commission would be necessary to
put the bill on the Popular agenda. The Commission would not have a lineitem veto power, and could only vote on whether the bill, as drafted by the
groups in civil society, should be given an official docket number and placed
on the Popular agenda. Any initiative deemed to be a protest measure against
a bill floating about in the Legislative branch would get top priority on the
agenda. If the Commission rejects a proto-bill, it must explain its decision
with a public document. The General Printing Office would take care of
distribution, as is traditional. And the mass media could pick up the slack.
Once on the agenda, the Commission would arrange hearings, much the
way Congress sends bills into committee for hearings. This would help them
arrange the days of deliberation. There is more to say about how the
Commission must go about its task of agenda-setting and framing, but these
considerations must be set aside until Part VI.
After achieving the rubber stamp of the Commission, only citizens can
kill a bill by not achieving a three-fifths majority vote at a deliberative
assembly. If a measure gets killed by a deliberative assembly, the
154. See my discussion infra Part VI, for the details of just how civil society would
function in this hypothetical regime with the administrative agency to which I gestured in Part
I.
155. In this context, I elaborate upon statewide or nationwide Popular activity. Citywide activity could also be integrated, but city government's unicameral structure would
require a slightly different, though analogous, set of procedures.
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Commission must make sure that no substantially similar measure gets
placed on the Popular agenda by initiative efforts for three years; this, too,
would be a procedural infraction justifying a bill being killed before it gets
to the people again.
Should the measure succeed, however, the bill-now signed by the
executors of the deliberative assembly-would then be considered by the
relevant legislators and executives on a priority basis. All relevant
legislatures must ratify P1 before it arrives on the desk of the Executive for
signing the bill into law: only a supermajority of a legislative body could
override the informed will of the people established at the deliberative
assembly. Essentially, once signed by the Commission, each legislative body
votes whether to "override," granting them a veto power. If any legislative
body-the House/Assembly requiring a two-thirds supermajority, or the
Senate requiring a three-fifths supermajority (and in either case, at least a
15 6
simple majority of the other cameral entity)-vetoes, the bill should die.
After legislative "endorsement," the Executive (the President or Governor)
must sign the bill for P1 to become a law. The Executive might choose to
veto and would have ten days in which to convince the Legislative branch to
reconsider. Ten days after an Executive veto, the bill goes back into the
legislature for another tally.
If the Executive can get a mere majority of the members of the
legislatures (in both the House/Assembly and Senate) to approve his veto,
the bill dies and the informed will of the people would be choked by the
hands of their own elected representatives. More likely, however, the
mandate of the people would be heeded quickly and efficiently: P1 would be
signed, making its way through the "fifth branch," the administrative
agencies that are responsible for getting the laws tailored properly (subject
to a judicial review of their interpretation of the Popular mandate). Of
course, the usual amendment and repeal procedures would be available to
legislatures down the road, but they would likely be resistant to exercise
their powers against the Popular branch. After all, unlike the randomly
selected delegates at the Popular assembly, legislators are politically
accountable and desire reelection. Does that not sound like a well-mixed,
well-separated, and well-balanced democracy in action?
Here's another try: Imagine the day when the war on drugs is
acknowledged as a failure. Imagine further a day when legislatures make an
effort at compromising on the details of decriminalization, but get frustrated
156.
waived.

If a bill dies by veto, perhaps the three-year waiting requirement should be
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at their inability to push an effort to legalize marijuana through the houses,
even with the generous campaign contributions of Phillip Morris to
Republicans and Democrats alike. The lawmakers from both sides want to
stop using endless time on the floor debating the issue and they think that
Popular input may be a good way to resolve the matter. Imagine that a twothirds vote of a House/Assembly, or three-fifths majority of a Senate want to
send the marijuana question to a referendum. In order to get a bill before the
Commission in the Popular branch, the Legislative branch would need a
relevant supermajority of one cameral entity1 57 and a simple majority of the
other agreeing to let the question leave the legislative bodies for Popular
adjudication. Once it makes it through one house with the relevant
supermajority, it becomes a top priority for the other entity. Two different
forms of referendums, statutory questions (like the drug question) and
158
constitutional questions, could make their way onto the Popular agenda.
Of course, by this hypothetical time in the future, the idea of a national
referendum would not so be foreign.
Assume that HR876, or S543 as it is known in the Senate, gets its
necessary two-thirds of the House/Assembly, so only a majority of the
Senate is needed to acquire a docket number, P2, with the Popular
Commission. By this time, of course, the bill has made its travels through
various congressional committees and hearings, including the joint
committee, ironing out any differences between the cameral entities. To be
sure, the drafters of the statute to be adjudicated by the Popular referendum
are responsible lawmakers who do this sort of thing for a living.
Nonetheless, they, too, are restricted to the eight double-spaced pages. If
only all of us could keep our proposals down to eight pages!
But when referendums come to the Popular branch, the findings of the
various committees that related bills have already received are automatically
admissible to the Commission, so that the Commission can get a firm history
and background on the bill. Though the bill must still be limited to eight
pages, the legislature must submit all reports pertaining to the bill, so as to
help the Commission do its job. The Commission, of course, could also call
its own witnesses and conduct its own investigations to pare down the
157. Note that the "lower" house requires a higher threshold for its supermajority
requirement.
158. Here, I make no mention of mandatory referendums, certain provisions that must
go to referendum according to state constitutional requirements. To be sure, I would argue to
replace even these referendums with Popular adjudication in order to counteract the obvious
shortcomings of the general referendum procedures. But that is another essay. Maybe there I
could also argue that the Electoral College should be a Deliberative Poll with binding results.
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materials for the deliberative assembly, but it could not kill the bill when the
mandate comes from the legislature and it must arrange a deliberative
assembly.
The deliberators can always reject P2 after thoughtful discussion. A
failure to pass P2 would ensure that the issue could not come before the
Popular assembly again for three years by way of the legislatures,
encouraging the legislators to work toward their own bargaining and
compromises with the added advantage of having a voice of the people.
Nonetheless, if a Popular initiative brings the issue before the Popular
branch later, the Commission should allow the item to be placed on the
agenda again. (Similarly, an item put on the agenda by initiative in the first
instance may be rehearsed a second time if the item comes from the
legislature by way of a Popular referendum.) But the people's refusal to pass
a measure in their deliberations should not preclude the legislature's passing
the identical bill in a traditional manner if they so choose, for whatever
bizarre reason they might want. 159 And so powers are not only separated,
but also shared.
After the deliberators vote to pass the referendum measure, the bill
would be signed by the commission and go directly to the Executive's desk.
Should the Executive choose to veto, the veto would again need a majority
of each house to sustain such action after the Executive receives ten days to
plead its case. Otherwise, P2 becomes law and stoners all over America can
light up after the Food and Drug Administration makes up its necessary
regulations to specify just what the law means. The FDA, like the rest of the
public, would have access to the transcripts of the deliberative assembly,
giving it a chance to instantiate the voice of the people and address any
concerns of the sanctimonious overruled. Again, once the people have
spoken, it would certainly be quite strange for representatives to try to veto
the outcome, especially in this case where the houses could not arrive at a
'right answer' themselves. Mechanisms for amendments and repeals,
however, should remain available to legislatures.

159. If legislatures try preemptively to nullify an initiative campaign, passing a law in
the traditional manner that conflicts with a supermajority achieved in the Popular branch, the
Popular law should be upheld, unless it is successfully vetoed by a supermajority of a
legislature or the Executive authority (and subsequently upheld by a simple majority of
legislators). Complicated, right? Maybe I'm being too specific, ignoring easier solutions or
harder and more basic problems that I should be addressing. Surely, more work elaborating
upon this balancing act will be required before anyone can hit the 'GO!' button on the Popular
branch. Nonetheless, I want to give a taste of how this might all look.
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2. The Executive
The next questions that arise pertain to the role of the Executive in the
activity of the Popular branch: Can the Executive send a bill directly to the
Popular branch, bypassing the legislatures? Does the Executive get the lineitem veto like many governors, or should this power be withheld from the
Executive, as it is from the President?
These are legitimate questions, but sticking to tradition seems very much
in order. On the first question, the simple answer is no. Executives could
offer a bill to go to referendum, but it would need to get through the
legislative houses in order to get onto the desk of the commission. On the
second, the Executive's veto powers should stay consistent with the powers
the Executive currently has. In statewide Popular decisions, the Governor
would generally have the line-item veto; in national decisions, the President
would not have such power. The Executive branch's lawmaking powers and
oversight responsibilities could remain intact, subject to judicial review if it
oversteps the directives of the Popular branch, and administrative agencies
160
could make use of the Popular branch to settle matters of public opinion.
As a last matter with respect to the Executives, it should go without saying
that they should retain all emergency powers now associated with those
offices, notwithstanding the power of Popular laws. 16 1 Though there is no
deep reason for this conservative approach, I see no pressing rationale to
cause further confusion.
3. The Judiciary
There are two places that the Popular branch could intersect with the
Judicial branch. The people could be consulted or challenged. Judges could
send matters to the Popular branch for a gauging of public opinion, in which
case the branch would have only recommending force. Or, judges may be
asked to review efforts of direct democracy taken by the Popular branch. I
shall address each possibility in turn. Yet, since such a large body of
literature is already available surrounding the general question of the judicial
review of direct democracy, the reader is directed to those debates for
treatment of the broader theoretical issues such an activity invariably
160. This use of deliberative assemblies in the administrative wing of the Executive
branch has been suggested before. See generally DELEON, supra note 6.
161. Legislatures, too, should retain their emergency powers. But to override a Popular
law should require a supermajority of sorts. Of course, if it were a real emergency there should
be no problem getting the required votes in the houses.
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raises. 16 2 Here, I offer only guidelines for approaching the question from a
practical standpoint, assuming a more textured direct democracy is already
in place, shifting, to be sure, the nature of the debate.
Imagine a day, long off in the future, when judiciaries start to feel that it
is time to overturn one of the most outrageous and embarrassing precedents
on the books that remains stare decisis, Bowers v. Hardwick.16 3 But one of
the details standing in the way of such judicial action is the Court's
statement there, invoking Moore v. East Cleveland, that the precedent is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's [I tradition." 164 In order to overrule the
decision-with the Court's own authority, the Nation's traditions-any
appellate judge (or a simple majority of those sitting en banc) at the state or
federal level could convene the Popular branch in an assembly to decide
current popular conceptions of national traditions. The judges could keep
their questions rather simple, and include all relevant facts and findings in a
memo to the Popular branch's administrative Commission, which would still
be responsible for organizing the assembly. Nonetheless, the majority of the
framing would be facilitated by the Judicial branch, the famously "least
16 5
dangerous branch."
The Popular deliberation would result in a tally, but there would be no
threshold that needs to be reached because in this instance the Popular
branch operates "consociationally." Judges could appeal to citizen input as a
basis for decision-making and investigate transcripts and post-deliberation
questionnaires to get a sense of why people decide as they do. Moreover,
having demographic breakdowns of voting patterns might help justices do
some social science, investigating citizen prejudice with modem statistical
methods.
After the vote is in, the judges would, of course, be free to ignore
informed popular opinion, especially if the tally proves the issue to be a
hotly contested one, with one side achieving only a slim majority. It is also
certainly possible that even an informed supermajority might agree with
Bowers for a number of reasons: as with Justice Burger's concurrence in
Bowers, national traditions might get conflated with "Judeo-Christian moral
162. See generally Eule supra note 40, for the most famous of these discussions.
163. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
164. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
165. Compare ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLnCS (1962), with THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (A. Hamilton)
("[tihe judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them").
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and ethical standards," 166 ignoring the restrictions of the Establishment
Clause. In these instances, the courts might still want to overrule the people,
constituting their national traditions instead of merely listening to them.
They ought to have such a freedom because the Popular branch still has at its
disposal the legislative capacity to amend the laws, and even the
Constitution. Nonetheless, the courts will always interpret those laws and
their applicability. This brings us directly into our next discussion regarding
the possible judicial review of the actions of the Popular branch.
a. Judicial Review
Alexander Hamilton's perspective on judicial review in The Federalist
is always a good place to start: "[wihere the will of the legislature declared
in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the
former. ' 167 While it is certainly a strange move to equate directly the will of
the people with the Constitution, 16 8 the basic need for judicial review cannot
be underestimated. Keeping the legislators in touch with the people and their
fundamental rights and values-as articulated in their Constitution-is one
of the stronger rationales for judicial review in The Federalist.
But, as Julian Eule notes:
[t]he enactments that reach the judiciary via the legislative route are those
that have successfully passed through an extensive filtering system. This is
majoritarianism plus. It is the plus that reflects the Framers' unique version of
democracy, and it is the plus that warrants judicial caution in substituting its
own judgment. Refined, or filtered majoritarianism, captures the virtues of
169
popular sovereignty without being tainted by its vices."
In fact, Eule goes further to say that "[jiudicial review is most essential
in the presence of unfiltered majoritarianism."' 170 This approach leads him to
recommend heightened scrutiny or a "hard judicial look"' 17 1 when it comes
to the activities of direct democracy, where unfiltered majorities generally
166. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
167. Id. at 439.
168. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAw AND DISAGREEMENT (1998) (especially ch. 12);
Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradoxof Democracy, in CoNsTrUTIoNALIsM AND
DEMocRAcy, supra note 70, at 195-240.
169. Eule, supra note 39, at 1532.
170. Id. at 1584.
171. Id. at 1558.
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have the power to legislate. He argues against "the instinctive appeal of
Hugo Black's view that the level of appropriate scrutiny ought to decline as
democracy becomes more direct," 17 2 insisting that the theory of judicial
review must integrate the claims of direct democracy and have heightened
jurisdiction above them:
Just as arguments for judicial restraint based on separation of powers or the
sharing of interpretive power fail to carry over to review of ballot measures,
those premised on comparative competence make little sense when removed
from the legislative context. The superior legislative ability to collect
information and to sort it out is routinely invoked by courts deferring to
legislative judgment. Whether or not legislators actually do outperform
judges at fact-finding, both groups perform with a lot more proficiency than
the electorate. If the accuracy of decision-making is to be our criterion, the
electorate stands at an obvious disadvantage. It lacks the staff, resources,
time, and understanding to compete favorably with either judges or
17 3
legislators on this count.

Eule is certainly right that mass democracy needs to continue to be checked
by the courts, but given the regime I propose, competence and resources,
evidenced in capacities for fact-finding and interpretation, are no longer
withheld from the people. Since direct democracy would have a different
infrastructure that would allow for filtered and representative
majoritarianism at the level of the Popular branch, the claims that Eule uses
to justify his hard judicial look no longer apply in their strong form. The
Popular branch is not merely populist; it is republican in its own right. And
Article IV of the Constitution requires that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
17 4
Government."
Regardless of whether one ultimately sides with judiciaries giving a
"hard" or "soft" look upon the actions of the Popular branch, surely they
have a right to take some look and would have some jurisdiction over its
activity. Though here I bracket the question of whether courts should review

172. Id. at 1508 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971); and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 397 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
173. Eule, supra note 39, at 1538 (citations omitted).
174. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
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ballot measures prior to elections, 17 5 after a law is passed, judges should
have some right to check efforts in the Popular branch in order to prevent
majorities from trampling upon fundamental rights in a way inconsistent
with the Constitution.
To this end, we must consider at least four types of activity in the
Popular branch:
1. Statewide statutory actions taken in the Popular branch could
obviously be reviewed by state courts on state constitutional
grounds. Should the statute raise federal questions, federal courts
could accept jurisdiction.
2. A statewide constitutional amendment passed by the Popular
branch could be reviewed only by federal courts, provided the issue
warrants review. As Eule notes, "Itihe electoral accountability of the
state judiciary leaves little hope that state courts will have either the
ability or the desire to take a leading role in filtering plebiscitary
results. When federal constitutional rights are at risk, the judicial
role must be played by an independent judiciary. And the
independence demanded must insulate the courts from the people as
well as from the legislature." 17 6 Though there might still be a
backlash associated with judges overruling the informed actions of a
state (raising difficulties with the practice of federalism), judges
should retain the right to preserve the federal Constitution.
This far any rational institution designer in the United States would
argue: "voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot
measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation." 17 7 My
regime, by injecting the deliberative conditions into popular activity
supposedly associated with legislatures, gives Popular decisions the force of
legislative decisions. Yet, it gives them no more legitimacy for the purposes
of judicial review.
I would go further, however, to include provisions for amending the
Federal Constitution, as well as providing a forum for federal statutory
action by the Popular branch:
175. For that discussion, see Michael I. Farrell, Note, The Judiciary and Popular
Democracy: Should Courts Review Ballot Measures Prior to Elections?, 53 FORD-tAM L.
REV. 919 (1985).
176. Eule, supra note 39, at 1580 (citations omitted).
177. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
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3. A federal statute passed by the Popular branch could be reviewed
by the federal court system in order to assess its constitutionality.
Judges could also delimit the scope of the passed bill to keep it
within constitutional restraints, giving them a form of line-item veto.
In this case, as with others, transcripts and questionnaires from the
assemblies that created the laws would help justices perform their
interpretive tasks.
4. Only the fourth possibility, an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States passed by the Popular branch, should give pause to
the inhabitants of a country with a California. On the one hand, if
Hamilton is right that the "power of the people" should be "superior
to both" the judicial and legislative powers, then any amendment
passed by the populace must express its will and should take
precedence over precedent. 17 8 For Hamilton, the Constitution is an
expression of popular will, which then should be capable of being
amended by Popular will. Yet, on the other hand, constitutional
amendments are quite serious affairs, and it might cause concern
that this proposal allows a supermajority of a group of stratified

random samples of laymen' 79 to enact monumental changes for the
entire country, circumventing the elaborate procedures for
constitutional amendment enumerated in Article V.
But with further tailoring, the procedures of the constitutional
conventions (in a manner of speaking) could have higher, or simply
different, supermajority requirements. The threshold for Popular
"ratification" of their own initiatives could be heightened to a threefourths or four-fifths supermajority, while amendments originating
in Congress or state legislatures might only need simple majorities
or two-thirds majorities. Perhaps the double majority requirement of
Switzerland (a majority of voters of a majority of cantons need to
ratify for passage of a referendum there) could be put use effectively
in these cases. 180 Perhaps petitions for federal constitutional
amendments would need the signatures of a higher proportion of the
electorate, with stricter geography distribution requirements.
Perhaps only the Legislative branch could put a federal
178.

THE FEDERAUSTNo. 78, at 437 (A. Hamilton).

179. As aforementioned, in the case of Popular consideration of federal questions,
many assemblies would be convened all over the country and some voting aggregation
mechanism would be applied.
180. See Kris Kobach, Switzerland, in REFERENDUMs AROUND THE WoRLD: THE
GROWING USE OF DuRECT DEMOCRACY 98-153 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994).
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constitutional question on the Popular agenda pursuant to the
supermajority requirements already delineated in Article V, and
federal constitutional Popular initiatives would be rejected ex ante
by the federal commission organizing the nationwide activities of
the Popular branch. Perhaps ratification by the Popular branch
should be required after the criteria in Article V are met. Or,
perhaps, if the life of the Popular branch were on the line and this
was the only detail of the system that was unacceptable, the
privilege to amend the federal Constitution could simply be withheld
from the Popular branch. But if it isn't-and I hope it wouldn't bejudicial interpretationwould be welcome with the help of the public
transcripts of the Popular constitutional convention, though judges
obviously could not rule on the question of constitutionality.
In any case, however, a court cannot review any legislation enacted by
the Popular branch without its first passing scrutiny in the other branches.
This ensures that referendums and initiatives bear some stamp of approval
from politicians, not merely the electorate, leaving the specialized question
of judicial review in this context slightly redundant.
4. Back to the Party
After this brief and simple, if not superficial, foray into a possible
constitutional integration of the Popular branch, questions concerning
political parties remain and are quite relevant. Though the Constitution itself
did not anticipate the formation of the modem party system, parties play a
crucial role on the American scene. This, however, is not the appropriate
context in which to enter the various debates weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of two-party systems and multi-party regimes with
proportional representation. 18 1 Nor would it be appropriate to take a
diversion to discuss the sociology of parties or to discuss the oligarchic
tendencies of modern party democracy. 18 2 Instead, it will suffice to show
how the Popular branch and the two-party system in the United States could
coexist, regardless of the normative assessment one might ultimately make
181.

In this regard, see, for example, MUELLER, supra note 32, at 101-74; MATTHEW

SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS (1992); and Ackerman, supra note 14.
182. See, e.g., ROBERT MICHEIS, PoLrICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden & Ceder Paul trans., 1999); LEON
EPSTEIN, POLmCAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (1967).
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of party democracy. 18 3 In any case, it is important to remember that the
"separation of powers in American states, often producing a divided
Executive and Legislature and the need to work with cross-party coalitions,
is surely a greater influence on the structure of [] parties than any provision
84
for direct legislation."1
Referendums and initiatives, when they are not operationalized as I
propose they should be in the Popular branch, are often said to "contribute[]
greatly to the relative weakness of political parties."' 18 5 Widespread use of
initiative campaigns surely undermines party control of agenda-setting 1 86
and works against the parties' general "programmatic function." 18 7 Even
intra-party unity is sometimes sacrificed in cases of direct democracy,
destabilizing the party system in general. The results of a recent referendum
in Switzerland make this point: "51 percent of FDP supporters knowingly
went against the recommendations of their party, as did 55 percent of
Christian Democrats and 60 percent of Social Democrats." 188 Similarly,
evidence in Switzerland suggests that MPs and elites show dissension within
parties as well when referendums are put to the public. 189
. Ian Budge, an advocate of both direct democracy and parties, identifies
four main claims that are often cited in the literature that attest to the
weakening of parties in regimes that rely on direct democracy. Direct
democracy weakens parties
1.By removing some legislative matters from the control of the government.
In particular, decisions are forced on matters neither raised nor framed by the
parties.
2. As a consequence of this, it reduces the coherence and consistency of the
policy package that the ruling party is trying to promote.
183. This is a practical strategy. Even if parties are "in decline," I would want them to
see my reform as consistent with their interests because, at least for the foreseeable future,
getting party endorsement is a way to get votes. Moreover, constitutional amendments would
be virtually impossible without party support. Nonetheless, arguments could go both ways: a
case could be made suggesting that the Popular branch would weaken parties and that it
would strengthen them. It is not my purpose here to weigh these claims. This would be an
appropriate question for the literature that this proposal spawns to address.
184.

IAN BUDGE, THE NEW CHALLENGE OF DRCr DEMocRAcY 122 (1996).

185.
186.

Kobach, supra note 180, at 132.
For more on agenda-setting, see infra Part VI.

187.

See EPSTEIN, supra note 182, at 261-88.

188.
189.

Kobach, supra note 180, at 132.
Id.
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3. Single-issue groups are more extreme and less compromising than
political parties, so popular consultations encourage the taking of extreme
positions and reduce the possibility of negotiation and agreement.
4. Leaders may take opposing sides in popular consultations and electors
19 0
may ignore or even defy the party lead where it is given.
Budge rebuts each of these claims, however, noting that they are even
"inconsistent among themselves," and are "simply contradicted by other
commentators who see electors following a clear party lead when it is
consistent with its ideology." 19 1 Furthermore, elite dissension is common in
large party systems in general, and referendums are no more likely to cause
rifts than are extreme policies adopted by major parties to help form
coalitions in regimes without direct democracy. 192 Two-party systems
without direct democracy still require party responsiveness to social
movements and have parties integrating shifts in popular opinion to stay
popular. Moreover, unity could be preserved within parties by avoiding
taking stances on referendum questions that are not tied to their ideologies,
hence actually strengthening the parties and their packages. 193 And
"[c]oherence and consistency are in the eye of the beholder and not
particularly evident inside government programs themselves, even where not
194
affected by direct legislation."'
Nonetheless, Budge acknowledges that
Magleby identifies the greatest defect of direct legislation in U.S. states as
bypassing and weakening the political parties, which constitute the best
means of clarifying and balancing the political debate. Cronin... concurs on
this weakness of direct legislation and indeed sees greater party involvement
19 5
in it as a major way of remedying informational and other weaknesses.

190.
191.
192.
193.

supra note 184, at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. (citing David Butler & Austin Ranney, Conclusion, in
BUDGE,

REFERENDUMS AROUND

THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOcRAcY, supra note 180, at 260).

194.
195.

Id. at 121.
Id. at 94 (citing CRONIN, supra note 42, at 70, 230; and DAVID B.

MAGLEBY,

DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 192-99

(1984)); see also David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation in the American States, in
REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMocRAcY, supra note

180, at 254-57.
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But parties could have central functions in Popular activity, and would
look to play a role if the Popular branch became constitutionally integrated:
electors still lack guidance on how to vote and parties can help fill in the gap
by working to fill informational vacuums. 19 6 Even if firm stances by parties
are unnecessary and avoiding taking such stances in certain instances may
enhance party integrity, parties could still help the Popular branch
contextualize a policy question. They could help frame the debate in the
mass media with all of their soft money and provide information about a
potential policy's impact upon some more general policy package that their
party is trying to promote.
Of course, these potential contributions only need to be mentioned in the
case of a Popular initiative. In the case of the Popular referendum, where the
relevant bill originated in the legislatures, parties would play their traditional
role in bill negotiation and compromise. Since initiatives are far less likely
than referendums to garner even a simple majority, 197 most cases of 'direct'
legislation that pass scrutiny will still result from party input in the various
houses. Hence, even direct democracy as I conceive it here will make use of
parties.
In a regime with a Popular branch, parties could and probably would still
monopolize candidate selection in general elections. Since financial power,
votes, and credibility accrue to those who run on large party tickets,
candidates will have large incentives to appeal to party resources. To be
sure, the hegemony of the two-party system might need reorganization with
an institutionalized outlet for single-issue activism, but it remains likely that
parties would be clever enough to absorb single-issue advocates into
coalitions. Parties (especially minority parties) might also help sponsor
Popular initiatives because they might assume that bills would have a better
chance for passage by the Popular branch than in the legislature. Moreover,
parties might want a clear mandate from the people, precisely what the
Popular branch, with its deliberative assemblies, is intended to produce.
Moreover, since supermajorities are generally required for Popular decisionmaking, 19 8 even single-issue advocates would likely want to reach a broad
base to get their measure passed and might compromise to appeal to parties
themselves, who control large blocs of votes. Also, since single-issue parties
could generally get their issue considered only once every three years, third
parties forming on the basis of such a limited agenda would necessarily be
196.
197.
198.
building is

BuDGE, supra note 184, at 98.

Id. at 96.
Supermajorities might be easier to attain in multi-party systems, where coalitioncommon.
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unstable or temporary, giving the two main parties the impression of relative
stability.
Yet, even if none of these informational and framing functions is
performed by parties in a regime with a Popular branch, the parties will still
need to concentrate their efforts upon getting their candidates elected. Even
if they refuse to provide cues and research assistance to facilitate the Popular
branch's will-formation, parties could continue with politics as usual,
especially since normal politics will generally be a time with few measures
than can actually gamer the required supermajorities in the Popular branch.
IV. REPLIES TO MY HYPOTHETICAL CRITICS
Designing institutions, wearing the thinking cap of a Founder, demands
keeping on one's desk near the quill a specter of the present. Reform is about
doing better than the status quo without purporting to solve all of the
problems associated with current institutions. With that caveat in mind, I
proceed to address various sorts of objections that could take aim at my
Popular branch.
A. "Couldn't deliberativeassemblies be corrupted,just like any easily
targetedsmall group of decision-makers?"
In an effort to control for corrupted moderators and potential "foremen,"
federal judges serve as checks in each of the smaller groups. But in this
enlarged public sphere, all citizens have the potential to be bought off. Since
citizens might be susceptible to bribery and propagandists (though these
problems plague legislatures at least as badly today), major efforts would
have to be made to sequester the jury during the several days of the
proceedings. Furthermore, the names of jurors would need to be kept
completely confidential before the assembly. When serving on a jury,
citizens would be prevented from interacting with anyone other than their
fellow deliberators. Even if each juror were granted the freedom to associate
with his family (a reasonable freedom indeed), much effort would need to be
taken to keep the jurors' identities away from the mass media and interest
groups prior to the event. To be sure, there would be corrupt people on the
Commission who might, for the right amount of money, compromise the
secrecy of the jurors' identities. Extraordinary questions at stake might
tempt extraordinary efforts on the part of corporations and interested parties.
But such problems with administration plague any attempt at reform. The
best we can do is to offer harsh penalties for those who tamper with the
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political machine and try to overturn results achieved through skewed
processes.
High profile deliberations, such as ones for abortion and affirmative
action, would be impractical to keep completely private during the actual
course of deliberations; most likely, the whole deliberation would be
televised (like some of Fishkin's Deliberative Polls)-at least on C-SPAN.
The population should be entitled to see how their fellow citizens are doing
their jobs as citizens and would want to ensure that the moderators (judges)
running the deliberative sessions are also doing their job impartially.
Perhaps the assemblies could be televised, only supposing the electronic
blurring of everyone's faces to preserve privacy. While some 'value of
publicity' obtains in any deliberative situation, the procedure's legitimacy
depends on inclusiveness. If we needed to excuse people who are
uninterested in publicity, we could not rely on the deliberations, as they
would suffer the voluntary response problem that undermines Fishkin's
polls.
B. "But shouldn't citizens have access to the goings-on of all deliberative
assemblies and understandhow the members of the jury arriveat their
decisions?Doesn't the 'value ofpublicity' demand the transparencyof
the procedure? Wouldn't excessive secrecy and opacity shroud its
legitimacy?"
Navigating between the competing claims of privacy and publicity is
particularly difficult in this context. 199 From one perspective, since the
deliberative assembly is a reform aimed to effect organization and
mobilization of the public sphere, the value of publicity and transparency to
the public is urgent. Yet citizens are generally entitled to their privacy in our
liberal regime. Nonetheless, in this context a case can be made to support the
claim that politics ultimately requires sacrificing some privacy for the sake
of policy juries, in the same way that the justice system requires citizens to
199. Interestingly, this dilemma illuminates the potential contradictions between
deliberation and Gutmann and Thompson's "value of publicity." See GuTMANN & THOMPSON,
supra note 4, at 95-127. I thank Ian Shapiro for bringing this contradiction to my attention. I
should mention that Thompson does make a case for when "democratic secrecy" is
appropriate, though he again runs into a difficult navigation exercise claiming that a secret is
justified only if "citizens and their accountable representatives are able to deliberate" to
determine if a secret "promotes the democratic discussion." Dennis Thompson, Democratic
Secrecy, 114 POL Sci. Q. 181, 185 (1999). While Thompson addresses an interesting
problem, his answers leave much to be desired. Another attempt to treat the problem of
secrecy can be found in MANIN, supra note 103, at 167-68.
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serve on juries more generally. I do not have a perfect answer to address the
question of "how much publicity is too much," but I am certain that our
regime ought to allow some flexibility for compelling state interests, like
legitimacy.
As a gesture in the direction of publicity, the transcripts and
informational pamphlets of the deliberations would remain public
documents. The documents could help judges and future generations make
sense of why a body decided as it did, surely another compelling state
interest. We might also administer post-deliberation questionnaires to help
judges in the rather unattractive process of shuffling through transcripts and
getting pointed answers to pointed questions. The questionnaires would also
remain anonymous, though we might keep some demographic information
available to judges to help them see if demographic variables played a role
in voting patterns.
Moreover, although we would need to keep a public record of those who
serve on policy juries, publishable after the assembly, how each member
votes should remain private. The final tally would be prominently displayed
on the cover page of the final report, but there should be no credible way for
a juror to prove that he voted one way or the other. 2 00 Also, every statement
recorded in the public transcripts would be ascribed anonymously. By
retaining anonymity, each citizen could feel comfortable sounding stupid
occasionally, only embarrassing himself in front of his fourteen codeliberators, the moderator, and the stenographer. Even if the proceedings
were televised, voices would need to be blurred along with faces to mask
identities. Though I prioritize a true publicity in the public sphere, liberalism
demands that we always keep the demands of privacy in mind as well.
C. "Don'tthese deliberative assemblies, in a sense,force people to be free?
Isn't the use of coercion offensive to even liberal republicans?"
My institutional design depends heavily upon compulsory service.
Without such compulsion, the statistical samples would be worthless
because they would be self-selected, a big no-no for any social science that
aims to be accepted by the scientific community. 2 0 1 Moreover, depending on
200. The use of voter credibility here is inspired from the work of Ian Ayres. See, e.g.,
Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating DonorAnonymity to Disrupt
the Marketfor PoliticalInfluence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
201. The voluntary response problem is one of the first things researchers are taught to
avoid. See, e.g., DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF
STATISTICS 265-67 (3d ed. 1999).
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self-selection undermines representativeness and vitiates the possibility for
textured civic identity as a consequence of adding the branch. But
liberalism's "leave me alone" ethos demands that citizens be allowed to
ignore politics: "Quite simply, we hate compulsion. '2 02 The libertarian
strain of today's vision of citizenship makes the adoption of this branch!
further unlikely.
To point out the obvious, however, our society regularly redistributes
wealth, makes jury duty mandatory, establishes federal holidays, and takes
other measures aimed to ensure (read: to compel) a textured civic identity
for the citizenry, encouraging a participatory ideal. 2 03 Sometimes liberty and
freedom demand an occasional endorsement, an amorphous establishment of
a civic religion of sorts. Of course, these efforts usually fail. Compulsory
participation in deliberative bodies is one more way of trying to achieve a
civic voice 2 04 without being so intrusive as to require a full-year
commitment from each citizen, as Dahl and deLeon's programs require.

202. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SocImTY 204 (1999).
Oddly, Ackerman stakes this claim just as he argues to compel a new wealth tax. Presumably,
coercion in the form of taxation is considered no coercion at all. I still (perhaps naively) think
that parity in social standing can be achieved without major economic reforms, without being
a "Money Liberal." I see this proposal as a quintessentially "Civic Liberal" idea. See MIcKEY
KAUS, THE END OF EQUALrrY 17-24, 58-77 (1992).
203. I should note that I prefer to see "participation" as a core value necessary for a
republican regime with CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY THEORY (1970)
and BARBER, supra note 9. While I agree with Fishkin when he elaborates upon "political
equality" and "nontyranny" as two of our core values, I (oddly enough) hesitate to endorse his
third, "deliberation." FisHKN, DEMOCRACY AND DELBERATION, supra note 8, at 29-41.
Strange as it may seem in this context, I think the need for deliberation arises precisely
because mass participation has pathologies that deliberation is well equipped to cure. I would
not build deliberation into democratic theory directly, because I think participation is more
basic in the quest to reify Michelman's condition of authorship than deliberation. Michelman,
supra note 10, at 147. For example, one might argue that participation helps establish consent
of the governed, a crucial feature of any liberal regime. But when the costs of nonparticipation are so low, deliberation can establish legitimacy through nonfictive (that is, nontacit) consent. Yet, participation is fundamental even if it cannot stand alone: deliberation
among elite participants is just as likely to be worthless for democracy. See FISHEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 52-53.

204. The value of achieving a "civic voice" as a curative to excessive individualism is
a common theme in the "post-liberal" literature. For this version of republicanism, which
often contains arguments for deliberation, see generally MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC Pn..osoPHY (1996); Frank Michelman, Law's

Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); and Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
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But I should not speak too quickly because there are two senses of
coercion. First, coercion results when government acts autocratically against
citizens and claims for itself a legitimacy that ultimately cannot be ascribed
to the will of the people. When institutions deny due process and deprive
people of liberties that they have endorsed as important, this kind of
coercion obtains. However, this sense is irrelevant to my proposal if only
because I would want to see it adopted through the proper channels of
majoritarian democratic political life. When governments demand certain
things of citizens (like jury service or taxation), as long as proper democratic
procedure is followed to create the demand, a certain degree of legitimacy
can be claimed on behalf of the governmental decree.
But perhaps there are certain spheres of life inalienable by government,
and any infringement would qualify as coercion. This is the second sort of
coercion. For example, if the majority of Americans passed a law
condemning all law professors to death, we could say strict majoritarian
democratic procedures still failed to produce any legitimacy. But now we are
back to the problems associated with the tyranny of the majority with which
I have already dealt. Could the institution of deliberative assemblies by an
act of the people, for the people, really constitute coercion of the malignant
and tyrannous sort? I cannot see it.
Others endorsing a strain of civic liberalism have argued for mandatory
conscription and community service. 20 5 Those proposals should be
considered on their own merit and are independent of the proposal I argue
for here. But I suspect that service on a deliberative jury a few times in a
lifetime might accomplish some of the goals of those programs without
being as much of an imposition on citizens' lives and without needing to
cope with as much "conscientious" objecting and complications of
administration. Nonetheless, the goal of class-mixing, emphasized by Kaus,
is preserved in my proposal. I go further precisely because legitimacy-not
merely civic virtue-is in view.
Although each citizen might only be expected to take part in a few civic
juries in a lifetime, each of which lasts only four or five days, such a
requirement could have drastic sociological effects on the political public
sphere by thoroughly reconceiving it. With such a transformation, the mass
media would need to treat the citizenry differently (as voters) because the
voter is less easily commodified and more easily treated as a possible
decision-maker who is going to be forced to hear and weigh both sides of a
proposition. The deliberative assembly should serve to make people less
205.

See generally KAUS, supra note 202, at 78-102.
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manipulable, which may contribute to a more general civility evidenced in
the way citizens treat one another (as voters and fellows), especially in the
mass media. I am entitled to set my hopes high.
In general, many reform proposals (this one included) aim to achieve
more equality in "social standing." 20 6 But politics can only hope to,
ameliorate the problems of social inequality if the space of politics is
renewed and extended. If realized properly, the public sphere can be a site
where citizens meet and greet each other; their 'enlarged mentality' where
they take account of public reasons, can be facilitated and checked by real
confrontation with peers in public life, not with an engagement of an
abstract and non-discursive Original Position. If citizens can see one
another's shoes as they make political decisions, they are more likely to be
able to feel what it might be like to wear them. In this political space, where
consideration of others is more direct, contestatory dialogue might actually
20 7
produce a legitimate political life.
D. "Why can only eligible voters take part in assemblies? Why draw the
line there? Shouldn't immigrationpolicies be debated by a jury at least
open to those directly affected by or interested in the decision?"
Of course, a cosmopolitan could ask why the deliberative juries are
limited to citizens. Immigrants may be affected by a Popular effort and my
assemblies generally desire that some of the affected parties participate. So
how can I exclude non-citizens?
There is no simple answer. Sometimes, arbitrary lines have to be drawn.
In this case, however, it is somewhat less than arbitrary. The nation-state
will often need to make decisions with global repercussions, but to allow for
global representation would undermine the extent to which the deliberative
assemblies are convened to express the voice of a particular people. To be
sure, high-minded largesse is a perspective that should be heard as people
deliberate about the future of their country. But the civic voice is supposed
to utter the character of one nation and one people, not the peoples of the
world.
Of course, deliberative assemblies would be useful in other contexts.
Within the workplace, a federation of states, or multinational corporations,
this model of deliberative publics could be employed to great global
democratic effect. But this proposal concentrates on deliberative publics in
206. See generally id.; SHKLAR, supra note 1.
207. For an inspirational account of this kind of deliberative polity, see RoNAt
BEmmnI, PoLmcAL JuDGMENT (1983).
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American political life because in this instance it achieves not only more
democracy, but also textured civic identity. Two for the price of one. More
democracy might be a goal in other private or cosmopolitan contexts, but
here the addition of the possible achievement of civic identity is a further
republican reason for its urgency. If by some freak chance, "world
citizenship," comes to have any meaning for the peoples of the world in the
future, deliberative publics would be useful for decision-making in global
policies, for many of the other reasons deliberative publics are desirable.
Within the university, deliberative publics with decision-making power
might be used to help settle disputes between administrations and graduate
students, instead of reliance upon the bargaining mechanisms so often
sought. But these kinds of applications are far beyond (and often come shy
of) the scope of what I am trying to do here.
E. "Could a participantin a deliberative assembly who proves persuasive
be permitted to runfor public office? Could people be allowed to use an
assembly in the service of politicalambition?"
Though some with political ambition might try to use the assemblies in
service of opportunism, I include three mechanisms to work against such
use. First, since I avoid the problem of self-selection, no one could find a
way to become a juror-each one is randomly selected. Because no one is
allowed to volunteer to be one of the 525 deciding votes, someone who
wants to use their status as a juror to catapult a career in politics may have to
wait around a fairly long time for the opportunity.
Both of the other mechanisms pertain to credibility: the office-seeker
could not with ease draw upon her experience at a deliberative assembly to
encourage voters to vote for her because of the effect she had on a particular
policy outcome of an assembly. A potential candidate could not credibly
claim to have swayed the results of more than the fourteen deliberators in his
deliberating chamber, since deliberators debate with only fourteen others
over the course of the assembly (though they may be subject to plenary
sessions for briefing and the like). Though a juror has access to all of his 524
other peers at meals and other recreational events or night activities, most of
her arguing and convincing would take place in the sub-groups. Should a
juror stand on a soapbox delivering speeches at plenary sessions, she is
bound to be regarded as a loon, not as someone worthy of attention. I suspect
that during lunches deliberators would want to talk about things other than
what they are 'forced' to talk about all day. I would hope they get to hear
about each other's non-civic domestic existences.
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Also, even if the ambitious wanted to claim that they were able to sway
the vote with their powerful arguments, they could find no credible way of
proving that they were the ones who delivered the decisive arguments. Since
the public record would record no names in the transcript, there would be no
credible reason to believe anyone claiming to have uttered certain parts of it..
To be sure, there are ways around these constraints of credibility: the
ambitious could recruit witnesses for their campaign; they could try to tape
themselves illegally (sparking a Popular-gate scandal); they could send
themselves registered mail with the arguments they plan to use before the
event. But by making it harder, the ambitious would be less likely to use
deliberative assemblies for opportunistic purposes.
This discussion raises the previous question: would it would be so
terrible if a deliberator tries to use his role as a public servant to become
another sort of public servant in office? I cannot see why I should prohibit it
prima facie. Since I am not as committed as Fishkin to deliberative
assemblies as a way of turning a random sample of people into media stars,
and since I am more concerned with the privacy of the deliberators, I do not
think deliberative assemblies will catapult anyone to national stardom. But if
deliberating and taking part in the legislative process inspire some to take a
more active role in political life, I see no reason to stop them.
F. "Isn't there empirical evidence that controverts Fishkin, showing
incompetence and inefficiency in actualpractices of deliberation?"
As aforementioned, 20 8 Button and Mattson undertake a survey of seven
practices of deliberative democracy over the course of 1997 and reach
somewhat disheartening conclusions. Yet their forcefully unhopeful
conclusions about potential practices of deliberative democracy are not
completely consistent.
They lament the large degree of deference demonstrated by citizens to
experts, 2 09 but applaud the outcome that citizens come away feeling that
they want to be a part of deliberative situations more often. Since most of
the cases studied by the team were largely organized for what they call
deliberation's "educative" function, 2 10 it should not be surprising that the
deliberators functioned as spectators instead of actors, and that many came
208. See the sources cited supra note 43.
209. Button & Mattson, supra note 43, at 610. But, simultaneously, we must ask if it is
such a bad tradeoff to defer to experts when the alternative might be deferring to deep
pockets.
210. Id. at 612.
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away cynical because their deliberations had no practical effects. The
problem of citizen deference to experts is precisely part of the reason that
deLeon's PPA could never be enough to instantiate significant deliberative
input. Moreover, Button and Mattson's confirmation of the frustrations
associated with spectatorial politics demands a more active sense of political
judgment for the citizenry. 2 11 Their study is very useful for making the
argument I do here, that deliberative bodies should act on policy not just
discuss it, that Popular deliberation should enact policy decisions.
Interestingly, the single case study that the study labels "activist," where
there was a gesture suggesting to the citizens that their deliberations would
produce policy, was the one structured most unlike the civic juries I
recommend here. In the case of Portland's energy regulation meeting, there
were 200 deliberators who were not broken up into smaller groups, too many
persons to effect fruitful dialogue. In that "activist" situation, the most
"educative" kind of deliberation took place. Not surprisingly, it was
considered the least successful of the lot.
Yet, Button and Mattson's findings, that many who take part in the
deliberative practices want to do it again and get more informed as citizens
in general, coheres with Fishkin and Luskin's findings. 2 12 The study further
substantiates my speculation that such bodies would contribute to the kind of
civic virtue communitarians and republicans alike think necessary for the
proper functioning of a democracy.
G. "Depending on the analogy with juries raisesproblems for the model:
Are juries so reliablethat we should depend upon them in the legislative
process?"
The literature on juries is, by and large, heartening. 2 13 But a notable
critique by Marianne Constable might force a harder and more careful

211. For a theoretical treatment of the problems associated with passive political
judgment, see generally BEINER, supra note 207; HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1982); and HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
212. See Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8.
213. Obviously, I cannot do any real justice to this subject in this context. The
literature is, of course, not univocal. Nonetheless, my research does bear out the positive
hypothesis and is a cause for cautious optimism. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN
AMERICA (1988); VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); REID HASTiE,
STEVEN PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); SAUL KASSIN & LAWRENCE
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL (1988); RITA SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980).
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Yet that theoretical look does not contest the consensus of the
empirical assessments. She agrees that juries' decisions tend to be
unpredictable (so heuristics would not be efficient), reasonable (so we ought
not worry about mass psychology yielding wacky decisions), and in the
interests of justice (so we should not worry that groups selected by lotterywill be tyrannous). Instead, Constable attacks the methodology of the
studies. She claims that they take for granted a certain theory of law and
justice by which they assess jury competence. By assuming that acting in the
interests of justice means deciding in a way consonant with what lawyers
and judges might consider just under similar circumstances, the social
science work already presupposes that rightness and legality precede jury
deliberations. 2 15 She may be right about the presuppositions of the social
scientists (hardly a devastating critique in this context), but their findings
should be calming in any event.
Nonetheless, this does raise a further question of the extent to which
analogizing from jurors to deliberators is coherent. Jurors are generally on a
fact-finding mission and simply because juries are competent on that score
does not mean that they could handle nuanced questions of policy and
compromise. What the evidence does show, however, is that jurors in small
groups, chosen by lottery (and strategic lawyers making broad peremptory
prejudiced judgments), can leave their prejudices at the door and debate
about complicated and technical matters in a productive way.
Two further complications are worth exploring, though they both show
instances where the deliberative situation is discontinuous with the jury
analogy. First, deliberators are essentially asked to debate about their own
fate and not that of some anonymous "peer." This remarkable difference
undermines the analogy because asking people to leave their prejudices at
the door when they decide the fate of some stranger is one thing; asking
them to deliberate about their own interests with an enlarged or public
mentality is quite another. Nonetheless, deliberators will often be debating
about issues that do not touch their daily lives. Though affirmative action
debates may intersect everyone's life in some oblique fashion, not everyone
has an interest in the relevant and damning sense. And even supposing that a
few deliberators do have an "interest" in the relevant and damning sense, it
clearly wouldn't be right to exclude them. Also, juries usually need
unanimous consensus; but I never ask for that much when it comes to policy.
After all, juries have the power to send people to their deaths; popular
214.

See

MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994).

215.

Id. at 58.
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assemblies might revoke affirmative action. That might put things in
perspective!
Perhaps one last empirical matter might allay a concern that people are
always looking out for their self-interest in deliberations: after one Fishkincontrolled Deliberative Poll, taxpayers "were willing to pay at least $1 more
on their monthly bill for renewable energy." 2 16 In three separate
Deliberative Polls conducted by the Texan utilities industry, participant
willingness to pay more on their bills increased after deliberations by an
average of approximately 30 percentage points. 2 17 But I do not deny that
areas of discontinuity suggest that we should not depend on the analogy too
heavily.
Another realistic concern with the jury analogy comes from Cass
Sunstein. His general worry is that juries tend towards extremism and
polarization: "People who are opposed to the minimum wage are likely, after
talking to each other, to be still more opposed; people who tend to support
gun control are likely, after discussion, to support gun control with
considerable enthusiasm." 2 18 His empirical findings suggest that "for any
dollar above zero, the general effect of [jury] deliberations [is] to increase
awards above those of the median voter." 2 19 In sum, groups tend to polarize
to extreme positions. Surely, any deliberative mechanism will have to be
careful to avoid some of the tendencies Sunstein diagnoses as proclivities for
group interaction.
While Sunstein's diagnosis has significant implications for the practice
of juries awarding punitive damages, taking account of this particular
pathology of group deliberations is built into my institutional design. Even
Sunstein admits that "Fishkin's groups do not polarize, at least not
systematically; this result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting,
in which materials are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of
fact and value." 2 20 Since my branch works like Fishkin's, polarization
should be easy to avoid.
The jury analogy can, indeed, fail at various critical points. But precisely
because it fails, I do not rely too heavily on jury procedures. Instead of
twelve people picked by lawyers making racial and ideological assumptions
216.

217.
218.
L.J. 71, 71
219.
220.
116-17.

FisHKiN, VOICE OF ThE PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 220.

Id.
Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
(2000).
Id. at 96.
Id. at 73 n.6. Sunstein offers many other reasons for Fishkin's success. See id. at
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in their screening processes at the voir dire, the system I adapt from Fishkin
insists on a more elaborate scheme of representation and randomization.
Moreover, I depend on moderators to ensure fruitful informed discussion as
opposed to relying on potentially tyrannical foreman. My supermajority
requirements, in conjunction with the filtration mechanisms in place within
the deliberation, help my proposal embody the virtues of a truly republican,
that is truly representative and citizenship-enhancing, form of government.
H. "Why require a two-thirds supermajority to enact a law at the
assemblies? Why isn't half enough? Isn't a simple majority all that is
requiredon most versions of majoritariandemocracy?"
My attention to detail in this context may seem too technical: at such an
early design stage, it may not make sense to impose even more foreign
notions upon our form of government, even if the basic idea of the
supermajority is written into the Constitution. Nonetheless, I include it for a
particular effect critical in any attempt to institutionalize the assembly: I
want to build in an acknowledgment of the sheer power of the institution. If
voters get too excited by this possibility for direct democracy, I suspect that
they might resort to it to try to settle too many complex and charged
questions of policy. There may be dangers associated with constant
deliberative assemblies and having every political question settled by them.
In a sense, I would like to preserve a dose of "normal politics" and have the
population resort to these "revolutionary" assemblies in times of unrest
221
where normal politics seem to lose contact with the voice of the people.
But in order to keep "revolutionary" politics at bay, only to be used in
special circumstances, I want to make it slightly more difficult to get a law
enacted through the use of the procedure. Of course, there will be many that
do not want the bar for "revolutionary" politics to be lowered.
To be sure, this hesitance seems to work against the spirit of what I have
been arguing until now. If I am right that a normative conception of popular
221. The normal-revolutionary dichotomy was, of course, first introduced by THOMAS
S. KUHN, ThE STRUCTURE OF ScmNTIc REVOLUTIONS (Otto Neurath et al. eds., 1970) (1962)
and later co-opted for political theory by BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991) in his discussion of the "constitutional moments" of American constitutional history.
Ackerman never cites Kuhn, but he does entitle two of his chapters "Normal Politics" and
"Higher Lawmaking." See id. at 230-94. Since deliberative democracy has come in vogue,
some like to think of "moments" as episodes of mass deliberation. I hope my proposal
presents a way to induce more mass deliberation, since revolutionary politics seems to have a
capacity for legitimation that normal politics does not, at least according to Ackerman. See
generally id.
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sovereignty demands that we establish deliberative assemblies as I conceive
them, then perhaps I should back away from my supermajority requirement
and let the Popular branch settle as many questions as the people want them
to settle.2 2 2 If I am right that our separation of powers can accommodate
deliberative assemblies and that Arendt is wrong to see the ward system as
completely revolutionary, why bother with the normal-revolutionary
distinction here confusing matters? As a first rejoinder to the second part of
this challenge, here the notion of the revolutionary is re-conceptualized: I do
not mean to adopt Arendt's revolutionary category of violence and complete
newness. 22 3 Instead, the revolutionary could take the form of mass
mobilization or might be a response to a social movement (to Arendt's
horror), resulting in Popular legislation.
As an approach to the previous question, I can also invoke again the
notion of the mixed regime and insist that the goal of popular sovereignty is
only part of the locus of legitimacy. Deliberative assemblies cannot be
expected to settle all issues, so some circumscription of appropriate agenda
items might be in order. What special circumstances would warrant the use
of the assembly consistent with principles of popular sovereignty? I have no
principled answer except to say that we should be wary of its abuse; the
supermajority requirement might prevent bad-faith or specious measures
from going to trial, so to speak, because the chances of winning Popularly,
are not very high. It might prevent very close calls from going to "the
people", allowing elected representatives to hammer out a compromise, as
their job often requires. Proximally, and for the most part, I leave the
Founders' republic pretty much intact.
My distaste for our current system is evinced exactly because people
(read: "the people") have few places to turn for considered change or
reform. The options given to the citizen by the two-party system are quite
limited, and political action has become a game of money-allocation by
PACs to get access to the decision-makers. Instead of encouraging real
revolution, I want to provide an outlet for revolutionary political action. To
be sure, there will always be an uphill battle to win a supermajority. But
when the time is ripe, it would be more efficient and civic to have citizens
decide political questions without having senators play politics for years
before getting a bill passed.
222. See BuRNmEim, supra note 7 (arguing that we should do away with all
representative electoral politics); Threlkeld, supra note 9 (arguing rather radically that all
legislation should be jury-tested).
223. See ARENDT, supra note 86; supra Part III.A.

HeinOnline -- 33 Rutgers L.J. 430 2001-2002

2002]

A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH

Perhaps as a last empirical note on the subject of supermajorities, I
should establish that supermajorities do not keep the bar for revolutionary
politics too high. Supermajority requirements may be as silly as unanimity
requirements; relying on the need for consensus could undermine the whole
political process in a society where majoritarianism has always been the
procedural rule. But the empirical work shows that supermajorities can be
achieved, even given the informational vacuum usually associated with mass
democracy. Of the sixty-nine statewide measures that went to the "citizen
lawmakers" in the elections of 1987 and 1988, twenty-three achieved
consensus rates of sixty-five percent and above, one way or the other. 224
Also, of the 157 statewide initiatives passed by voters from 1970 through
1986, fifty-three achieved the supermajority. 22 5 Moreover, "Massachusetts
and New Hampshire both required a two-thirds majority of citizens voting in
a referendum to ratify their original constitutions. In both cases the initial
drafts failed to achieve this majority, but did so subsequently following the
226
inclusion of the Bill of Rights."
Europe, too, provides grist for the supermajoritarians mill:
The political instability that plagued France in the years following World
War II led more than 79 percent of French voters in September 1958 to
approve a new constitution. Constitution-like changes to give Algeria its
independence and thus end a bloody war were approved by majorities of
French voters in excess of 75 and 90 percent in 1961 and 1962, respectively.
Eighty three percent of those voting in a referendum in Ireland in 1972 voted
in favor of joining the European Economic Community (EEC). More than 98
percent of voters in Iceland voted in 1944 to separate from Denmark and
2 27
form a republic.

These are the sorts of facts that encourage Dennis Mueller to set his
supermajority requirement for efforts of direct democracy at a three-fourths
22 8 He
majority, an even more skewed mandate than I recommend here.
224. DAvID SCHMIDT, CrrIzEN LAwMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 21114 (1989).
225. Id. at 287-94. Using sixty-five percent as a benchmark here is arbitrary: sixty-five
chosen
because it is a round number slightly below the two-thirds supermajority I would
is
recommend, but above a three-fifths majority.
226. MUELLER, supra note 32, at 180 (citing DAVID BUTLER & AusTiN RANNEY,
REFERENDUMS: A STUDY IN PRACTICE AND THEORY 68-69 (1978)). In this earlier volume,

Butler and Ranney offer the justification for preferring "referendums" to "referenda" Id. at 2.
227. Id. at 180.
228. See id. at 182.
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argues that majority parties in either multi-party or two-party regimes can
too easily take advantage of simple majority requirements in systems with a
referendum also built in. Big parties can provide big cues to voters,
especially in cases of statute-phrasings that are bewildering in the first
place. 22 9 Even if Julian Eule is correct that "political parties seldom take a
stand on ballot measures [and that] external cues are more difficult to come
by [in referendums] than in candidate elections," 23 0 Mueller is also right
that big parties in certain situations could abuse a simple majority
requirement. If a big party can push through a referendum and get it passed,
the party can undertake major governmental reorganization to benefit itself
for the long term. 23 1 On behalf of Mueller's case:
[o]n two occasions .

.

. referenda in Ireland were held to replace Ireland's

system of proportional representation with electoral rules favoring a twoparty system as in Britain. The referenda were initiated by the Fiana Fail,
Ireland's largest political party, in an effort to increase its power .... The
basic rules by which political outcomes are chosen should have a greater
2 32
permanence than the outcomes themselves.
This raises the possibility that different thresholds can be set for
different sorts of direct democracy, a suggestion made by Mueller himself,
and one that I followed above. But more complex schemes could be
arranged: for example, statewide statutory initiatives might require only a
simple majority, while constitutional referendums or amendments proposed
by initiative might demand a three-fourths majority. Mandatory referendums
demanded by state constitutions, since they have already passed through a
vast filtrating system of representation, might only require a simple majority.
National constitutional amendments would have the highest Popular
threshold for passage, at three-fourths or four-fifths, as I have already
suggested. A chart could be drawn, data could be crunched, and an equation
could be calculated. But I just keep the two-thirds here as a simplified
guideline before the scientific calculators come out.
L A cute little question could be asked now: "Once a supermajority
requirementis in place, isn't any effect of deliberationessentially
undetectable?Even if deliberationproduces some changes in popular
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. at 181.
Eule, supra note 39, at 1516.
MUELLER, supra note 32, at 181.
Id.
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opinion, are any large enough to make a difference with the
supermajority requirement?"
Michael Neblo's recurring finding that deliberation produces consensus
around a middle of the road compromise suggests the opposite of Sunstein's
findings about polarization. 23 3 Deliberators can learn to compromise and
rally around a moderate policy in supermajorities, even if the groups start
the deliberation heavily polarized.
The real evidence to answer this question, however, should come from
Fishkin's 'before and after' findings. In his "selected results" from his eight
Deliberative Polls from 1994 to 1997 (a reason for slight suspicion, to be
sure), Fishkin reports in nineteen out of forty-one issues that deliberation
produced a change of percentage that would alter the side accruing a simple
majority. Fifteen different issues acquired supermajorities one way or the
other after deliberation, while nine of these had 'already' achieved a
supermajority prior to deliberation. But of these nine, three had
supermajorities affirming their opposing side after deliberation!
Furthermore, in nine other cases, on the other hand, issues that had received
a supermajority prior to deliberation failed to hold onto their 'lead' after
deliberation. And five of these cases were ones that had a shift in even the
simple majorities after deliberations. 23 4 Even if Fishkin's data here is
selective, it still bears out the claim that deliberation's effect would not
leave supermajorities useless or impossible to attain.
V. THE THEORY PART OF THEORY AND PRACTICE (WITH MAXIMS FOR

GOOD MEASURE)
In conquering the muddled uncertainties of politics and suborning
reasonableness to rationality, they [philosophers and ideal discourse
theorists] have served the ideal of enlightenment better than they have
informed our political judgment.... Rights get philosophically vindicated
but only as abstractions that undermine the democratic communities that
breathe life into rights; justice is given an unimpeachable credential in
epistemology without giving it a firm hold on action or the deliberative
process and then recommended to citizens, but in a form that answers to the
constraints not of citizenship but of philosophy; civility is celebrated, but
233. See Neblo, supra note 49; Sunstein, supra note 218, at 74-75.
234. FisHriN, VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 214-20. Again here I use the
sixty-five percent cutoff to determine a supermajority. And in the last statistic, three of the five
were the ones that demonstrated 'super shifts' in supermajorities.
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construed as incompatible with the sorts of collective human choice and
23 5
communal purposes that give civility its political meaning.
I do need some theory to ground part of my approach to practical reform.
In particular, this Part aims to explore how deliberative assemblies can be
viewed as achieving reasonable decisions, without depending too heavily on
any metaphysical conception of rationality as a supreme legitimator.
Joshua Cohen provides some philosophical tools to ground and better
describe a version of deliberative democracy, even though I shall try to be
less foundationalist than he about the role of Reason in such a paradigm.
Some (including Cohen) think the whole framework of deliberative
democracy falls apart without an appeal to a strong notion of rationality. I
hope to explore in this Part how we can do without the strong version of the
ideal, because I am suspicious of Reason's tyranny and elitism; I do not
think we need to be iiberreasoners to make approximately legitimate law in a
democracy. Such metanarratives (even the Reason iiber alles story), such
versions of the good life, are precisely the kind of talk that people like
2 36
Ackerman cannot allow in the political public sphere in the first place.
But Habermas's more textured neutrality allows for moral disagreementand claims of superiority-in the public sphere. We should expect and hope
to see the irrational voice itself in a public sphere with any vitality.
In the first instance, discourse theory is supposed to be
postmetaphysical. Thus Habermas's wavering about whether people really
can be the source of legitimacy, especially if their reasoning and deliberation
do not effect rational or perfectly just results, undermines his use of
democratic discourse as a legitimator. Here, the faith that perfect
institutional procedures will produce perfectly egalitarian results need not
bind us: this faith causes headaches for many deliberative democrats who do
not want to admit that a perfect procedure without any substance (whatever
that might mean) cannot guarantee results. Habermas's criticisms of Cohen
will be enough to help us take a stand where Habermas himself wavers. I
conclude that such procedures, when checked by other institutions, are
decent approximations of legitimation (without the major problems of an
"ideal" deliberative democracy), which is reason enough to give them a try.
Habermas writes that "[d]eliberative politics acquires its legitimating force
from the discursive structure of an opinion- and will-formation that can
fulfill its socially integrative function only because citizens expect its results
235.

BENJAMIN

BARBER,

THE CONQUEST OF POLTIcs: LIBERAL PILOSOPHY IN

DEMocRATInc TviEs 193 (1990).
236.

See, e.g., BRUCE AcKERMAN,SOCIAL JUSTICE INTHE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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to have a reasonable quality." 2 37 This constitution of will-formation would
be a refreshing component to add to our democracy; we have other branches
in place to make sure that deliberative bodies will will more than merely
reasonable results-they must also will just results. But in my model, such
guarantors are peripheral to the deliberative bodies even if they must be
considered at the design phase.
A. Maxim-izing Deliberation
Cohen enumerates five conditions for the deliberative situation that
require some qualification for my use of the paradigm, mostly because the
deliberative situation here is not an ideal type. Instead, it is instrumental to
establishing a better, stronger democracy; the procedure is not grounded in
transcendental notions of Rationality. With Cohen, I want to say something
similar to the claim that laws achieve a justification through public
argument, 2 3 8 but since I allow in my model other non-deliberative branches
of government, public argument and reasons cannot be the only things that
accomplish the task.
1. DI'
Cohen's first condition (D1) for the deliberative situation is that it must
be ongoing, independent, and expected to continue indefinitely. 2 39 This is
fundamental for allowing each generation to change their minds, to alter and
abolish their laws. Each policy decided by a civic jury could never be
decisive forever. This is rather uncontroversial. And yet, implicit in the
open-endedness of the process, is an undermining of the ideal procedure as
such. If the ideal procedure privileges deliberation, and deliberation can
never decide anything decisively, then we must see actual deliberation as
stripped of its rigid Kantianism. If Reason could provide one answer,
questions would be settled; deliberation, though apparently replicable,
would be unnecessary. Prioritizing argument in politics is, as Bonnie Honig
has suggested is the case for Arendt (a deliberative theorist, though not
necessarily a democrat), "disruptive, agonistic, and most important, never

237. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 304 (emphasis added). Notice that deliberation, on
this reading, produces in itself the expectation, the anticipation, that its results will be
reasonable, not rational.
238. Cohen, supra note 3, at 72.
239. Id. at 72.
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over."2 4 0 This does not mean, however, that we cannot keep deliberative

laws enacted for minimum sentences, so to speak. A moratorium on
affirmative action for three years may be just the social experiment the next
deliberative jury needs to continue with the never-ending process of
authorship. If Boalt has no blacks without affirmative action, maybe the ban
could 'sunset.'
2. D2'
The second condition (D2) is a little stickier. Cohen writes that the
members must share "a commitment to coordinating their activities within
institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms they
arrive at through their deliberation. For them, free deliberation among equals
is the basis of legitimacy." 2 4 1 This is a rather stringent (and circular)
condition that is made much weaker in my model. As I have made clear, no
reason-not even a democratic or liberal one-can justify constraining the
debate. Moreover, the norms decided in deliberation cannot be the only
sources of legitimacy.
Responding to the criticisms of Frank Michelman, 2 42 deliberative
democrats would have to agree that commitment to the institutions that make
240. BONNIE HONIG, POLIncAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF PoLITIcs 9 (1993)
(emphasis added).
241. Cohen, supra note 3, at 72 (emphasis added).
242. The basic strategy of Michelman's 1997 attack on deliberative democracy is to
draw attention to the tensions inherent in the "liberal" and "deontological" aspects of the ideal
deliberative procedure. Michelman, supra note 10, at 152. He correctly places the site of the
law's validation in the democratic procedure for the deliberative democrats, but then asks how
they can justify a civil government that must always coerce, that must always provide the
enabling conditions for a deliberative regime. When deliberative democrats then appeal to a
version of "rights foundationalism," they are left in an undemocratic position where
arguments for "deep democracy" seem tangential at best. id. at 154-59. If everyone must agree
to his political situations, there is no plausible reason to imagine that deliberation will
necessarily work toward the end of "rights foundationalism." And if we have a procedural
account that endorses only procedures 'all the way down,' the procedures themselves must
come about unjustified by a deliberative mechanism. When deliberative democrats use their
"co-originality thesis" (even though they are clever enough to avoid the "self-legitimation
thesis") as a rejoinder to this problematic (as Habermas and Rawls do), we are left wondering
how coherent such a view can be. See HABERMAS, supra note 12; JOHN RAwLs, POLmcAL
LiBERALISM (1996). Deliberative politics cannot be self-legitimating and they cannot be
depended upon without other mechanisms already safely in place.
In this context, I cannot quite address all of Michelman's concerns. To be sure, he is
correct in most of what he says if his caricature of deliberative democrats is also correct. But
precisely because I think many of these deliberative democrats would heartily endorse my
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deliberation possible must prevent deliberators from always coordinating
their activities according to the norms achieved through deliberation.
Deliberation can go awry and produce decisions that flout liberal principles
by denying a minimal level of equal concern and respect for all citizens.
Therefore, I would revise the condition to something closer to D2': The
members of the deliberative assembly are aware that they are deciding
policy for an entire polity, not just themselves, and that they may still be
checked by constitutionalprinciples. Of course, they arefree to try to revise
such principles, subject to judicial constraints. For them, free deliberation
among equals is a basis of legitimacy in a republic. That said, they still
recognize that there is a vast system of checks and balances to which they
may be answerableand which attain their own levels of legitimacy.
The ACLU, for example, could bring suit against the people of the
United States if the Popular branch decides on a course of action that it feels
unconstitutionally infringes upon rights of a minority group. 24 3
3. D3'
Cohen's third prescriptive feature of deliberative democracy (D3) needs
to be dumped. He argues that deliberators "do not think that some particular
set of preferences, conviction, or ideal is mandatory." 2 4 4 This implausible
condition might only obtain in some ideal (not my ideal, it should be noted)
situation. It is entirely possible, and sometimes desirable, that people should
actually think the world hinges on a policy decision. Deliberators who have
strong convictions should be encouraged, not told that they are not
deliberating "properly." Habermas's hope that there will be no losers after
political deliberation is thus outlandish. Embedded in Habermas's and
recommendations here, the implementation of deliberative democracy might be more sound
than its theoretic instantiations. For example, "Mark Warren makes the case that deliberative
democracy requires an authority component because of its functional nature: there are too
many decisions for a minipopulus [the formal name for Dahl's recommendation] or policy
forum to consider." DELEON, supra note 6, at 120; Mark Warren, Deliberative Democracyand
Authority, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 46 (1996). Surely, this is another way of addressing
Michelman's charge, and making the case I do here.
243. As previously noted, the Popular branch's institution into the system of checks
and balances would alter theories of judicial review and its purview. More often than not, I
think the courts would tend to work to help enforce the voice of the people against legislators
and agenda-setters who refuse to heed the 'civic voice.' But the judiciary would also
occasionally need to overturn 'undemocratic' decisions, even supposing they were achieved
democratically..
244. Cohen, supra note 3, at 72.
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Cohen's program for consensus is a goal (or teleology) of unanimity even
though Habermas is, of course, aware that such unanimity may be a
"methodological fiction." Only anarchists or totalitarians really think
unanimity is a goal worth aiming for. 2 4 5 The rest of us realize that there will
always be struggles for recognition that go unnoticed, dissensus creeping
underneath the presentment of "political mandates." Some groups will
always have an agonistic and contestatory relationship with the state in a
complex society. And the hope is that deliberative politics can help give
access to more contesting voices so better compromises can be achieved, not
so a consensus might be reached.
4. D4'
D4 is mostly well-suited to my use: "Because the members of a
democratic association regard deliberative procedures as the source of
legitimacy, it is important ... that the terms of their association not merely
246
be the results of their deliberation, but also be manifest to them as such."
As usual, here again we must replace the phrase "the source" with the less
demanding "a source." D4 also contains a subtle defense of non-deliberative
mechanisms to serve as the "institutions in which the connections between
deliberation and outcomes are evident."'2 47 If the input of deliberators is not
heeded by the representatives in the Executive and Legislative branches,
appeal to the Judiciary would be appropriate to make deliberative decisions
"manifest."
5. D5'
The last of the conditions is the most metaphysical, but arguably among
the least controversial. D5 requires that "members recognize one another as
having deliberative capacities." 24 8 A strain of the "capacities argument" that
is used to justify the "equal concern and respect" criterion of much modem
liberalism, this condition does not require full "concern" (because people
will still want to forward group interests-and we should not stop people
from doing so as a matter of liberal principle). Nonetheless, it does demand
equal respect, making the assumption that people are not too stupid to rule
245. See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970) for a representative
view advocating unanimous direct democracy.
246.
247.
248.

Cohen, supra note 3, at 73.
Id.
Id.
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themselves. Equal respect may be enough to get people to talk to each other
respectfully, a necessary condition for deliberation.
B. Sufficient Conditions?
But what about sufficient conditions? What kinds of things will
guarantee that conversation will be fruitful? In moments of frankness about
the public sphere, we must acknowledge with Cohen that "in a well-ordered
democracy, political debate is organized around alternative conceptions of
the public good."'2 4 9 Yet it may be too much to ask for everyone to have the
public good at heart when they come to the proverbial table. At a minimum,
we can say that we would like political ideals to be "focused in the first
instance on the appropriate conduct of public affairs." 2 50 This minimum
actually provides a rather unconstrained deliberative situation, assuming that
deliberation attempts to embody a conversation about political goals.
C. Limits
But Cohen provides another facet of his deliberative procedure that may
prove useful in illuminating some of the limits of deliberation. He claims
that "there is a need to decide on an agenda, to propose alternative solutions
to the problems on the agenda, supporting those solutions with reasons, and
to conclude by settling on an alternative." 2 5 1 Ironically, in my institutionally
realistic model, virtually all of these aspects need to be addressed by nondeliberative mechanisms. Deciding on an agenda will largely be in the hands
of elites; proposing solutions will take expertise; providing organized
reasons will be done better by think-tanks than by citizens; and settling will
always require an aggregating endpoint.
Habermas is sensitive to the totalizing nature of Cohen's project.
Habermas's main finding against Cohen is that Cohen assumes that society
can be steered as a whole by deliberation. Habermas, in contrast, wants to
see the deliberative procedure "as the core structure in a separate,
constitutionally organized political system, but not as a model for all social
institutions (and not even for all government institutions). '2 52 This
statement runs counter to what most assume to be true of Habermas (and
Arendt), that deliberation should penetrate all spheres of life. But Habermas
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 73.
H4ABERMAS,

supra note 12, at 305.
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avoids the circularity objection of people like Michelman (as I do here) by
acknowledging "that democratic procedure must be embedded in contexts it
'2 5 3
cannot itself regulate.
Part VI below addresses how we can amend Cohen's formulation of a
deliberative democracy to allow for non-deliberative publics and
operationalize them in a way that connects them with deliberative publics. I
argue that we need a particular conception of civil society to realize the
potential for a transformation of politics in the direction of deliberation.
When we embrace this theoretical conception, we can find a way to cope
with the agenda-setting problem that I have been deferring until this final
Part. I have hesitated because I realize just how challenging the agendasetting problem can be.
VI. THE CIVIL SOCIETY AS AGENDA-SETTER
Habermas objects that ideal conceptions of deliberative politics are
"silent about the relation between decision-oriented deliberations.., and the
informal processes of opinion-formation in the public sphere." 25 4 To address
this objection and speak to the silence, I recruit Habermas's thoughts on
civil society. 2 5 5 Precisely because the Popular branch needs agenda-setters,
253. Id. Gutmann and Thompson make a similar justification for deliberative
procedures as a check to both liberal proceduralism and liberal constitutionalism, both of
which remain incomplete without an institutionalized deliberative politics. See GuTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 26-51. Of course, they never actually tell us how to introduce
deliberation into our regime as I try to here.
254. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 307.
255. The invocation of the "civil society" connection is, obviously, not something new
to Habermas. At least since Hegel this domain has been considered the place where the
"citizen finds his social place, his standing, the approbation of his fellows, and possibly some
of his self-respect." SHKLAR, supra note 1, at 63. I appeal to Habermas here because his
discourse-theoretic model helps demonstrate how the discourse networks that organize in civil
society can gain access to political institutions and how they may remain separate as a
playground for completely unconstrained talk. Civil society is a good site to practice for the
agonistic battlefield of politics. Yet, although Habermas understates its role and its capacity to
influence politics, he provides the basis for a more expansive use. I argue for a broader
definition of civil society but keep intact Habermas's vision of discursive civil societies
(though I relax the requirement that they be deliberative) and his insight that civil societies
function to bridge the "system" and "lifeworld." Yet, in many ways, my version of civil
society here is not orthodox Habermas precisely because I emphasize the need for nondeliberative processes in civil societies and de-emphasize any metaphysical need for Reason
as a legitimator. I acknowledge, of course, that orthodox Habermasians can be more extreme
than Habermas himself. See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, SrrUATING THE SELF: GENDER,
COMMuNrry AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETncs (1992).
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and because agenda-setting usually takes place on the level of the elites, I
need a mechanism where private individuals have better access to the
information-gatherers and filterers who will ultimately more directly
influence agenda-setting. Though my model achieves deliberation at the
decision-making level, the question of what is up for discussion still needs to
be "steered by communicative power." 2 56 In addressing the agenda-setting
dilemma, we can avoid the criticisms launched against the likes of Gutmann
and Thompson that "one could quarrel with the range of opinions that [they]
'2 57
find 'morally respectable' and therefore worthy of serious engagement.
Civil society, then, can function as a communicative steering mechanism
that facilitates getting certain issues as well as perspectives before
deliberative bodies. 2 58 In summary of what is to follow, civil society is, on
my model, "a network for communicating information and points of view..
. .; the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized
in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public
opinions." 25 9 To be sure, the agenda-setters still control too much
"communicative action" even in this paradigm, but at least they can be under
Popular control if the deliberative assemblies are made sensitive to the
integrative demands of civil society. Moreover, because voting is no longer
merely aggregative on my model, but is preceded by intensive deliberation,
agenda-setting is less likely to be able to control outcomes, the concern that
makes this Part so necessary in the first place.
At the level of civil societies, even the less stringent deliberative
situation described in Part V above is too much to hope for, so I part from
Habermas in requiring of civil societies that they be public spheres
themselves, insofar as public spheres are locales for some form of
deliberation. Even Habermas himself seems to acknowledge the advantage
of "unrestricted communication," as well as a "right to remain strangers"
with fellow citizens. 26 0 Civil society might be a layer of social relation
256.
257.

258.

HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 330.
Peter Berkowitz, The Debating Society, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 1996 at 36.
Some think that civil societies can only rarely exert their influence in crisis

situations. See JEAN COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CWIL SOCIETY AND POLrlCAL THEORY 587

(1992); HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 380. Even Ackerman's "moments" might be construed
as civil society's mass deliberation as a result of crisis. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note
223. It is instructive to note that for Habermas, however, we are always in a relevant crisis: the
crisis of legitimacy always arises. Of course, as Posner notes, Habermas's crisis may be more
of a German than an American concern. PostNER, supra note 29, at 98-107. But just because
Americans are blasd about legitimacy does not make it any less a legitimate concern.
259.

HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 360.

260.

Id. at 308.
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where we may be more entitled to apolitical talk or to ethnocentric
particularism. Thus, I am suspicious of the claim that civil societies "can
blossom only in an already rationalized lifeworld, ' '2 6 1 because excessive
rationalization of the lifeworld is precisely one of the forces that civil
society militates against in its self-defense against the system's imposed
2 62
rationalizing forces.
Of course, Habermas is still correct to note that civil society's
pathologies need tempering through the lifeworld's rationalization, which is
effected by publicity in the political sphere. But civil societies-or more
specifically, bowling leagues-need not be sites for anything more than
irrational bonding. We may hope with Habermas that those group affiliations
lead to political and collective action. Yet, adopting my proposal here could
plausibly cause a transformation of the mediatization of the political public
sphere, trickling down to civil societies' relationship thereto. With media
attention focused on citizen debate instead of sound-bite marketing, civil
societies will likely respond accordingly and get involved in the
conversation because they can no longer afford simply to attempt to buy
votes from elites in Congress or to pay marketing firms.
I follow Habermas in placing a lot of currency on whether civil society
"develops impulses with enough vitality to bring conflicts from the
periphery into the center of the political system." 26 3 In the best of cases,
civil society can provide this link from social concern to political concern.
Nonetheless, Fishkin cautions that "[tihe political sphere must be protected
from being determined by spillover effects from social or economic
inequalities in the society."'2 64 This conflation of spheres depicts our current
situation of the corruption of our representative system, one that regularly
experiences spillover from moneyed or empowered civil societies. Yet,
while the sphere should not be determined by such inequalities, the interests
of civil societies (often desires for a form of recognition) should have some
input into the political public sphere. Civil society must serve not only a
"signal" function, but also a "problematizing" and "thematizing"

261. Id. at 371.
262. This is not to controvert the trivial point that the lifeworld must be rationalized
simply in virtue of being a lifeworld: the lifeworld is always socially constructed through
various forms of rational communication. In this sense, the lifeworld is already rationalized,
but not necessarily a rationalization afforded by activity in the political public sphere, which is
the kind of rationalization that I think Habermas has in mind here.
263. Id. at 330.
264.

FIsHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION, supra note 8, at 31.
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function. 2 65 Though Habermas understates civil societies' capacity to
transform more than "the personnel and programming of [the] system,"
mostly because that is all they can currently hope to do, he is right to
emphasize that its impact upon the political process is, and should be,
through indirect influence. 2 6 6 This isolation of sorts allows it to function as
the kind of social glue that Michael Sandel and Robert Putnam urge us to
embrace, 26 7 while it also helps cure the pathologies of homogenous civil
societies. Sections A through C clear some theoretical ground; Section D
closes how we began-imagining practical institutional design.
A. Garnering Communicative Power
To have deliberative assemblies steered by "communicative power," we
could presumably try to depend upon prior deliberative assemblies to have
citizens voice concerns to signal future topics to be adjudicated by a
subsequent assembly. Or, we could just employ Deliberative Polling to elect
candidates, who would be depended upon to put the 'right' issues on the
agenda. But these possibilities stray too far from the purpose of the Popular
branch. The assemblies could not be focused if they tried to address too
many concerns, and the selection of candidates requires picking packages
with so many different factors and vectors that no preference ranking could
really do justice to the complexity of picking a 'bundle' of platforms.
Though my deliberative assemblies cannot aim to constrain conversation,
clearly I must have a particular (atomized) topic for each deliberative
situation; such situations could not purport to decide anything if they were
26 8
chaotic.
But this does not entail that the political public sphere itself cannot be
steered, or that it needs to be completely and purely deliberative. Not only is
such a version of deliberation unrealistic; but it is not even helpful as a
regulative ideal. Appealing to deliberation as the only source of legitimacy is
just the sort of thing Michelman argues is incoherent about discourse
theory. 2 6 9 As long as general election candidates are steered by a demi265.

HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 359.
Id. at 372.
See generally ROBERT D. PuTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNrrY (2000); SANDEL, supra note 204.
268. This is a serious concern with Threlkeld's idea, where civil juries decide
everything. See Threlked, supra note 9, at 5.
269. See generally Michelman, supra note 10. For a more lengthy exposition of his
strategy, see supra note 242.
266.
267.
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deliberative society that puts them in power, they can enjoy authority more
comfortably. 2 70 "[Tihe political influence that the actors gain through public
communication must ultimately rest on the resonance and indeed the
approval of a lay public .. ,,271
On an ongoing basis, however, we should expect and encourage forces
exogenous to the state and the political public sphere to make claims against
elected representatives and the population at large. And so much the better
for the political sphere because in this way it is open to competing, or
contestatory, public spheres that Nancy Fraser would want us to be attentive
to. 2 72 Because Habermas's model of civil society functions as a bridge
between the private life of citizens and more public political concerns, it is a
good nexus for, in his terms, the "lifeworld" to exert force upon the
"system." Indeed, for Habermas, civil society functions both as a selfdefense mechanism for the lifeworld to make sure it does not get completely
"colonized" by the system and as a check upon the activities of the state
when it meddles in public political affairs. In my model, civil society is both
a structure that helps protect the private sphere's inviolability (though I will
not develop a defense of this function of civil society here), 2 73 and a
structure that helps exert pressure upon the framing of the political public
sphere itself. With more organized access to the "system," the state, the
deliberative assemblies will not be suspected of being merely tools that the
2 74
state can use to impose its agenda from the top-down.
270. My argument does not suggest that we must do away with general election
procedures. I imagine that if my proposal were adopted, campaigns for general elections
would center around which items the candidate intends to put on the Popular agenda, giving
more substance to the idea of a political mandate. For an elaboration, see infra Part VI.D.4.
And that might shift the kind of mediatization of the political public sphere so much that
politicization might cease to be a bad word.
271. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 364.
272. See generally NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRmCAL REFLECTIONS ON
THE "PosTsOClAIAST" CONDITION (1997); Nancy Fraser, Politics, Culture, and the Public
Sphere: Toward a Postmodern Conception, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY

POLICs (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995).
273. For this argument, omnipresent in the civil society literature, see, for example,
PUTNAM supra note 267; and CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY (1989).

274. An aside: Neblo presents three cases where deliberation produces altered
opinions. In the issues of affirmative action and whether gays should be allowed to serve in
the military, noticeable changes in the deliberators can be charted. But Neblo labels the third
case, of deliberation about effecting a flat tax, an "outlier" because it did not produce the same
statistically significant shifts in opinion. Geoffrey Garrett has suggested that the third case is
the most important for testing deliberation because it was the one case where all present
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B. Mild Interest-GroupPluralism
Immediately, it should be obvious that my use of civil societies bears
resemblance to an endorsement of a mild version of interest-group
pluralism. 2 75 Civil societies, often bundled into issue-specified interest
groups, can have political influence that is normatively desirable. For
Habermas, influence "is converted into political power-into a potential for
rendering binding decisions-only when it affects the beliefs and decisions
of authorized members of the political system and determines the behavior
of voters, legislators, officials, and so forth."'27 6 In my model, civil societies
and interest groups could predominantly touch the authorized members of
the political system by rallying potential deliberators, a primary nexus of
authorized power in my proposed regime.
One can see how money and inequality of access sneak their way back
into my model through civil society. The interest groups with the biggest
advertising funds can conceivably rally the most support; they can then get
better access to the agenda-setters and influence deliberative assemblies,
albeit in a much more indirect fashion than they influence policy in our
current regime. But it is important to note against such objections that giving
civil societies (or interest groups) the indirect power to set the agenda should
be considered more democratic than providing them with the direct power
ultimately to decide issues, which is the sort of power they often enjoy now.
We currently live in the latter kind of oligarchic regime, and it would be a
move of dramatic progress (and regime-mixing) to try to instantiate the
former. Admittedly, I want to hold onto civil societies because of their
valuable social (not merely political) functions. Identity, patriotism, and
would be directly affected by the outcome. Geoffrey Garrett, personal communication (1999).
But given that Neblo's deliberators are always samples drawn from college students, it is not
clear that tax code affects them substantively more than affirmative action. Moreover, Neblo's
deliberators are not as informed as they are in Fishkin's models; Neblo spends less time
briefing and more time listening. Therefore, we should expect that lack of knowledge in this
instance contributed to a lack of fruitful deliberation. Last, when Neblo notes that his
deliberators did not feel very strongly about the flat tax one way or other, we might use that as
evidence (much as we do Steve Forbes's political failures) that the fiat tax does not have
substantial enough popular support to be an item on the agenda in the first place. See Neblo,
supra note 50. This last possible retort allows me to ignore Neblo's "outlier" finding because
such a subject would not be entitled (by any urging of civil society) to a deliberative jury in
the first place, since it would be especially unlikely to achieve a supermajority.
275. Setting interest-group pluralism as an alternative to republicanism is emphasized
by Richard Epstein. See Epstein, supra note 16. I make an effort here to navigate back and
forth, to have my cake and eat it, too.
276. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 363.
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other kinds of emotional connections to fellow citizens are radically
important for social maintenance, so I have no interest in trying to disband
civil societies that foster such senses, even if they are forums for self-interest
and not the public interest. All the better that such associations foster strong
beliefs; such beliefs will make a more vital public sphere. As William
Galston remarks,
even to achieve the kind of free self-reflection that many liberals prize, it is
better to begin by believing something. Rational deliberation among ways of
life is far more meaningful if (and I am tempted to say only if) the stakes are
meaningful, that is, if the deliberator has strong convictions against which
2 77
competing claims can be weighed.
Social standing, too, can be elevated and leveled by the actions of civil
society; such standing need not rely on formal political equality within the
state. When political actors do so rely on political equality, social parity
rarely follows.
Furthermore, some body must do the partisan work of making arguments
for adoption of one policy over another. If a racist group wants to submit a
recommendation of their own for a deliberative assembly about affirmative
action, there is no democratic reason that could justify their efforts being
marginalized. In fact, such material is likely to make the deliberations and
the choices that deliberators make based upon discussion of the materials
more legitimate, not less so. Of course, in the unlikely event that members of
the deliberative assembly ban affirmative action for the reasons provided by
the KKK, the courts could easily overturn the Popular branch without
hesitation.
C. Private and Public Contestations
Perhaps another advantage of conceiving of civil societies in the way I
have here is that such a conception addresses the concerns of liberal feminist
thinkers who "fear that the liberal version of the neutrality principle makes it
possible to keep from the agenda precisely those concerns hitherto
designated as 'private' according to conventional [read: phallocentric]
standards." 2 7 8 It further addresses the concerns of communitarians who fear
that the Arendtian gestures in Habermas towards a plenary political publicity
277. WILlIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PuRposEs: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIvERsrrY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 255 (1991).
278. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 312.
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co-opt private life in an undesirable and infeasible manner. Essentially, both
camps attack the homogenizing and totalizing potential of discourse theory
(probably because both orientations are susceptible to the critique as
well).

279

Habermas meets the feminists' fear halfway and distinguishes
"proceduralconstraints on public discourses from a constraint or limitation
on the range of topics open to public discourse."'2 80 While he thinks that his
tolerant version of procedural neutrality is unconstrained enough to admit
topics from the private sphere, the private sphere itself, he argues, is left
protected: "Legally granted liberties entitle one to drop out of
communicative action ....
"281 Of course, others question Habermas's basis
for such a distinction and see a "bias against privacy" implicit in his version
of the political public sphere. 2 82 But Habermas is insistent: "Certainly the
intimate sphere must be protected from intrusive forces and the critical eyes
of strangers." 2 83 He knows that his version of the public sphere can trickle
down into private life, so he needs a place in his schema where the lifeworld
can protect itself.
Civil society provides just this protection. Civil societies are necessarily,
and by definition, less juridified than the political public sphere because in
the political public sphere attention is focused upon the intersubjective
validity of laws. Indeed, the sphere only exists for the purpose of validation
and intersubjective legitimation. By providing space for civil societies in the
279. Since under strict neutrality liberalism, no textured version of the good life gets
publicized, so to speak, we get a rather homogenous public sphere where issues traditionally
conceived as private do not get airtime. And radical communitarianism suffers from a similar
problem when it recommends staying loyal to local inherited communities that are often
homogenous. Discourse theory, on the other hand, aims to find a way of coping with the evershifting public-private split and the fact of overlapping and conflicting loyalties.
280. Id. at 313.
281. Id. at 120.
282. See, e.g., Axel Honneth, The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical
Challenge of Postmodernism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS 289-323
(Stephen K. White ed., 1995); J. Donald Moon, Practical Discourse and Communicative
Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS, supra, at 143-64; Tracy Strong &
Frank Sposito, Habermas'sSignificant Other, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS,
supra, at 263-88; Georgia Warnke, Communicative Rationality and Cultural Values, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABERMAS, supra, at 120-42; Mark Warren, The Self in
Discursive Democracy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HABEMAS, supra, at 167-200.

Each of these articles, from different assumptions and angles, lashes a similar critique. But it
is Moon who is most consumed with this tension in Habermas. See J. Donald Moon,
ConstrainedDiscourse and PublicLife, 19 POL. THEORY 202-29 (1991).
283.

HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 313.
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schema, however, and by letting civil societies play a more central role in
politics, we can be assured that the political realm itself will be less
juridified. This is desirable because with less concern for entrenched legal
norms, we are more likely to be successful in attempts at experimentalism
and progress.
The portrait of civil society that I have sketched here highlights its
functional potential as an information gatherer and filterer. This function
serves the deliberative bodies indirectly in thematizing issues as well as
agenda-formation more generally. But it also has a self-protecting and selfdefensive function in shielding the individual from invasive state
mechanisms. Civil societies are not as repressive to individuality as stateimposed (read: top-down) agendas, even though civil societies too will often
give attention to collective juridical concerns, congregating for the purposes
of acting upon the law. Social movements that aim for legal mobilization are
part of civil society too.
Because civil societies float in the general public sphere and are
unconstrained there, "it is better suited for the 'struggle over needs' and their
interpretation." 2 8 4 Habermas is right that "[o]nly after a public 'struggle for
recognition' can the contested interest positions be taken up by the
responsible political authorities." 2 85 Thus, civil societies can address the
inviolability of the private with a view toward public recognition. If civil
societies can get things on the agenda, and they are simultaneously a place
for psychological clarification of identity, it is then a nexus for private
concerns to be voiced publicly (when collectives feel the psychological need
to petition the public sphere for recognition). Deliberative politics is then
properly realized as an "interplay between democratically institutionalized
will-formation" in the Popular branch and "informal opinion-formation" in
civil societies. 2 8 6 In this interplay, the game of keeping the public public and
the private private has the best chance for success.
D. The Practiceof PoliticizingCivil Society
Now that I have cleared some theoretical ground for the integration of
civil society into the political public sphere, I must find a practical way of
actually setting the agenda for the deliberative assembly with this marriage
in mind. Is there a practical way for the Popular branch to take account of all
plausible positions when it convenes to deliberate upon a policy? Who is
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 308.
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going to decide which opinions count as bona fide opinions? Jim Fishkin?
Would not interest groups with more money have more "communicative
power"? And would all bona fide opinions get equal airtime?
Let me sketch a tentative way to address these difficult design questions.
1. Submitting Opinion Proposals
Anyone should be able to submit a potential opinion to be included in
the deliberative assembly. That 'opinion proposal' could take many forms: It
might be an exercise in biblical exegesis; a scientific number-crunching
assessment of efficiency; an argument of normative political theory; or even
a personal rant. Unfortunately, I can see no legitimate way to discount any of
these sorts of arguments on substantive grounds. 2 8 7 Obviously, though, we
must limit the proliferation somehow because we could be sure that a
pamphlet of 500 pages of opinions, containing every possible argument on a
policy issue would rarely, if ever, get read in its entirety. Moreover, trying to
impart too many potential arguments at a plenary session prior to breaking
up into smaller groups would extend the "educative" part of the
deliberations too much, when deference to the best-looking expert in plenary
sessions is a likely outcome of that sort of design.
But when seminar professors assign so much reading that no one can do
all of it, many participants have done some of it and can make some valuable
contribution, even if oftentimes participants are talking at cross-purposes.
Such a scenario might obtain on the days of deliberation: each deliberator
will have read different sections of the pamphlet and will have her own
287. Again, here I differ from many discourse theorists. Because most base their ideals
of deliberation upon the legitimating powers of Reason, they are forced to disallow talk that
appeals to versions of the good life that claim a superiority of one group over another. See
generally ACKERMAN, supra note 238; Cohen, supra note 3. As annoying as biblical
arguments may be in political discussions, I cannot see how they can be left out of the
political public sphere in a democracy. I suppose I may be naively hoping that these kinds of
arguments just will not be very convincing. I am guessing that as public reasons, which are
precisely what is required in the political public sphere, they do not tend to work. Habermas
gives us another good reason to allow moralists to express their opinions: "if neutrality were
in addition to require that ethical questions be bracketed out of political discourse in general,
then such discourse would forfeit its power to . . .change prepolitical attitudes, need
interpretations, and value orientations." HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 309. We must at least
try to avoid the tyranny of Reason, the effect of closing out all reasons that are not sufficiently
'public' in character. Reason is, after all, just one version of the good life-one only made
necessary for the political public sphere by the contingent fact of value pluralism. Let us also
not forget that if the Popular branch passes a law because of a biblical argument, the courts
could strike it down.
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contribution to make. Indeed, each deliberator could be assigned small
chunks, requiring her to make presentations in the smaller groups. Fishkin's
research, after all, shows that people do make an effort to get informed
before they show up to deliberate with their peers so as not to look
foolish. 2 8 8 But now I am idealizing the seminar room a little too much; most
seminars are failures anyway.
A further institutional design could help my need here for filtering and
integration. When we consider to whom the opinion proposal is submitted, a
model emerges that integrates civil society with the political public sphere in
a more organized way.
2. The Bureaucracy
Ideally, it would be most efficient to have "Yea" and "Nay"
subcommittees for each of my Popular conventions (as Australia has). In
citywide, statewide, or nationwide deliberative assemblies, having two
subcommittees, both being guided and watched over by the general
Commission sketched above, 28 9 would be a good way to ensure that
filtration is facilitated by citizens themselves-in particular, nondeliberating partisan citizens. Recreating the advantages of the two-party
system for each Popular proposition could help bundle the platforms into
neat packages. To be sure, the leaders of these subcommittees will be
appointed elites of some kind: they will most likely be influential interestgroup activists that are in the public eye (and hence somewhat politically
accountable), chosen by the Commission to represent the side.
But the subcommittees will need to remain sensitive to others in their
camp in order to rally their support, both their financial backing as well as
their personnel. In this scenario, then, smaller interest groups appeal (or
perhaps even pander) to the subcommittees-which are civil societies, not
state-run units-rather than to state mechanisms directly. In this manner,
more perspective would get consideration and presentation.
3. The Recurring Problems of Campaign Financing and Voucher
Reform
Of course, money is still a huge problem in this schema. Cash would still
be very useful at the statute drafting (pre-assembly) stage, even if spending
288. See Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 8.
289. See my integration of Arne Leonard's CCCA, supra note 22, and accompanying
text at Part I.A.
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on advertising campaigns would require altering the medium and the
message: the media blitz would have to be less sound-bite driven because
campaigns would ultimately be subject to real scrutiny during the days of
deliberation and may never reach the randomly selected jurors. Nonetheless,
there is no easy or democratically feasible way to curb political speech to
keep rich folks out of funding activities in civil society. Very soon, I will try
to give a more satisfactory approach to this problem.
But once a subject for debate is in the public sphere and on the Popular
agenda, there is a way to level the playing field. The general Commission
that oversees the deliberative assembly should, after establishing the
question to be settled, accept applications from interest groups and nonprofit organizations wanting to be considered for public monies allocated for
gathering, filtering, and disseminating information. These groups would
need to demonstrate that their efforts would further the debate in some
educational fashion, and that their interests are substantially related to the
question at issue. Of course, each applicant would need to certify that any
monies would not be squandered (but could be transferred to another
qualified group); that it would not take any private monies or solicit
independent expenditures after being awarded one of the coveted spots on
the public money roster; and that it is not a front-group for privately funded
groups looking to get a piece of the public purse. Any failure to meet these
criteria would result in immediate disqualification.
All groups passing the preliminary scrutiny of the Commission would
then compose a paragraph-long mission statement to be included in a general
mailing. Prior to jury selection, the Commission would send these ministatements to each member of the community (the pool from which the
policy jury is to be randomly selected), informing them of the upcoming
deliberative assembly. In the mailing, each citizen would be told that the
Commission has allocated a prescribed amount of money to be distributed
among the various interest groups included in the enclosed pamphlet. The
citizen would be told that the interest groups included have agreed to take
only public money, but are entitled to transfer their funds to another partisan
non-profit group if they feel that their money would be better utilized under
a larger umbrella. The citizen would be informed that the public monies that
have been allocated for this stage of the deliberative assembly are aimed to
help thematize the issues relevant for the deliberative assembly. The money
would fund educational efforts, including buying media time, to give citizens
a chance to have input into their fellows who will ultimately decide the issue
at the assembly. The citizen would then be asked to allocate fifty points
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2 90
among the different groups in whatever way she feels appropriate.
Citizens would have a few weeks to complete their forms and return their
preferences along with an affidavit and accompanying identification
documents to ensure that the points were not awarded under coercion or on
the promise of perquisites, and to ensure that each individual only gets to
award fifty points. The funds available would then be distributed by the
Commission to the groups, proportional to the points awarded by the general
public.
Many good citizens will probably toss the lengthy pamphlet into the
garbage. But as long as we get a reasonable response rate, 29 1 this measure
will help ensure that some new faces will get access to the political public
sphere, actors usually reserving their activities to civil society. This
allocation mechanism does not solve all of our agenda-setting problems, but
it does expand who can get heard. Even the privately-funded civil
associations that will not qualify for public money may still want to pander
to some of the smaller civil societies that get awarded substantial monies in
the public mechanism. Substantial monies at stake for contest by the general
electorate may also encourage "big money" to help some of the smaller civil
associations indirectly, by advertising for them with independent
expenditures (though solicitation of them may be illegal). This contest for
cash at the outset would inundate people with important information that
would get them to start thinking about the issues even before they are called
to the proverbial roundtable.
One of the advantages of the design described in the previous subsection is that new committees, Yea and Nay, are effectively created to cater

290. Obviously, this suggestion bears close resemblance to Ackerman's "Patriot"
proposal. There are, of course, a number of differences: I do not do away with all private
money (civil societies can opt-out); I do not allow candidates or parties to vie for the cash; I
do not prescribe in advance how much to allocate to the program or to a particular election-I
will leave it to appropriations committees to figure a reasonable amount to allot. But I will not
belabor the differences in this context. See Ackerman, supra note 36.
291. The clever will notice here that I seem remarkably cavalier about the voluntary
response problem when I need to ignore it for my proposals. But I never claim that such a
problem always can be avoided. Instead, I argue that will-formation, which takes place in the
deliberative assemblies, requires true representativeness without the response problem. In
opinion-formation, taking place at the level of civil society and its organization and
mobilization, however, no such assurances need be made: civil society is predominantly a site
of voluntarism. Fishkin's Deliberative Polls can be vindicated, then, as their standard for
voluntary response need be no more stringent than that of radio talk-shows and town hall
meetings, both sites of civil society and opinion-formation with no necessary (only hoped for)
integrated political influence.
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to each deliberative situation. To be sure, bargaining (not deliberation)
would be the most likely form of communication within the subcommittees.
But that is entirely appropriate and is just one more instance where nondeliberative mechanisms can cater to deliberation. These committees would
be heterogeneous publics, as Young likes to call them. 2 92 Therefore, they
would not require special representation or protection for groups because the
subcommittees would absorb minority arguments to help their coalitionsand cash flows-in any event. But since the arguments of the subcommittees
would ultimately be subjected to the thoughtful consideration of 525 random
and representative people, they would need to make forceful arguments, not
just target the right pockets with campaign contributions, as interest groups
are wont to do in our current system.
4. Turning Back the Clock: Another Agenda-Setting Issue
I have said nothing about setting the agenda before an issue gets
signaled for deliberative adjudication. Is there no way that the people can
have better access to getting issues on the Popular agenda in the first place?
Of course, only people with substantial funds for signature-collection would
29 3
have any hope of getting a Popular initiative before the people.
Presumably, I could try arguing for a public funds allocation program
similar to the one described above at an earlier stage of the process, allowing
interest groups access to public money continuously. But this emendation of
the system would be exorbitantly more costly, 2 94 making it more infeasible
than it already is. Moreover, with constant begging coming from so many
different angles and causes, the field of public discourse would be too
undisciplined to serve as the sort of jolt for focused discussion that such a
program aims to effect.
Perhaps there is another way to address the problem by encouraging
candidates in general elections to set their agenda in line with the kinds of
items they would like to see raised in future deliberative assemblies of the
Popular branch. Since legislatures, with the supermajority requirement
discussed above, could send items onto the Popular agenda for adjudication,
candidates could be assessed in terms of what they actually want to bring
292. See generally YOUNG, supra note 13.
293. See generally BRODER, supra note 117.
294. It is difficult to predict just how much the Popular branch would cost, mostly
because there is no way to anticipate just how popular its mechanisms would be and how
often people would want to call upon them. Nonetheless, it is obviously far more costly to
provide constant public funding to any interest group that will not squander the money.
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before the public's purview. Of course, such a structural change of
campaigns certainly could not be forced upon candidates. Telling candidates
what they must say during a campaign feels wrong.
But empirical evidence suggests that candidates would have a propensity
to operate in this manner under the conditions of a deliberative regime in any
event. Candidates have noticed that running on the platform of letting the
voters decide issues directly, can propel their campaigns: "Candidates for
governor in California now regularly sponsor their own initiatives during
their gubernatorial campaign." 2 95 Furthermore, in 1992, the Colorado and
Michigan governors used similar tactics. 2 96 With the structural
transformation of the public sphere, we could expect this kind of behavior
more often. This helps voters set the deliberative agenda more directly,
albeit through a representative body.
Also, in states that make wide use of current referendum practices,
"issue activists have learned that placing an initiative on the ballot,
regardless of the outcome of the election, generates widespread media
attention for their issue." 29 7 So, one of the unintended consequences of this
part of the proposal is that it counteracts the supermajority requirement that
aims to dissuade potential losers from wasting energy and (public) money.
Since issue salience is important in its own right, many issue activists may
not care that their measures will fail to pass deliberative muster. Once they
acquire media attention and heightened sensitivity to their issue, groups
may, in the final analysis, resort to less deliberative (and less democratic)
mechanisms to forward their agenda. And if groups just make a game out of
deliberative assemblies, they will cease to serve their purpose of willformation.
But is that really so? Will no important objective be served if they are
used 'merely' as a means of gaining salience? The shift of the nexus of
power from the voter to the deliberator should have substantial effects on
how the individual is treated by the mass media. The aggregative aspects of
my proposed reform could still potentially commodify voters: interest
295. Magleby, supra note 20, at 29 (citing Pete Wilson, Jerry Brown, George
Deukmejian, Diane Feinstein, and John Van de Kamp). I should note that Magleby does not
find this phenomenon commendable. On the contrary, he thinks this sort of strategy "not only
diverts legislators from the work of the legislature, but encourages legislators to duck tough
issues and 'let the voters decide."' Id. Obviously, I respectfully dissent. But perhaps Magleby
would be more inclined to agree with my reliance on his work if he knew how I wanted to
change the initiative system.
296. Id. (citing Roy Romer and John Engler).
297. Id. at 28.
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groups could still calculate how much media money they need to spend to
get their message implanted in potential jurors. Nonetheless, the 'means of
production' of the aggregation undergoes a transformation. The private vote,
as John Stuart Mill astutely noted, is necessarily a commodity with an
opportunity for exercising private interests.2 9 8 But public deliberation could
change perceptions of interests and responsibilities, and thus cure the ills
Mill diagnoses with the private vote. The media, if it aims to shape public
will, would need to undertake its own transformation to fit better with the
decision procedure. Since the aggregation of uninformed votes would no
longer win policy elections, it is no longer in the media-manipulator's
interest to use techniques that avoid intelligent and more detailed
information. To be sure, these speculations about what might happen to the
mass media are ultimately empirical questions that we can only answer by
structurally transforming the public sphere.
Even if no initiative activists hope to win a supermajority at a
deliberative assembly, and just desire the salience in the media associated
with an assembly, a compelling state interest is still served. The level of
discourse in the public arena would be heightened, and the sorts of
arguments that must be put forth in the context of the assemblies must go
beyond advertising campaigns. Moreover, access to the public sphere is
expanded more widely into voluntarist civil societies by providing them
public funds for issue-education. In this way, opinion-formation in civil
society would have indirect but substantial input into policy decisions taken
in the political public sphere.
VII. CONCLUSION, OR JUST THE BEGINNING

Since Gerald Rosenberg has shown that courts are a generally
ineffective mechanism for bringing about social change, political theorists
have been forced to look beyond judicial activism for other hopeful routes of
progress and reform. 2 9 9 Even before the empirical realities of the failures of
judicial activism were broadcast, the standard objections to activism,
viewing it as undemocratic and counter-majoritarian, still obtained.
The model for reform that I offer here may be naYve. But the interaction
of civil society and deliberative publics provides another possibility for
democratic change. We should keep the courts and the elected
298. JOHN STUART MIL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT 323-39
(Geraint Williams ed., 1993) (1861).
299. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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representatives in place to keep the majority in check, as any good
Madisonian would. But the addition of the Popular branch into our
institutional mechanisms might get us closer to Avishai Margalit's civilized
society. 3 00 Instead of tortuously making efforts to get our institutions not to
humiliate anyone (the precondition for the decent society), we can
simultaneously, through confronting each other in a face-to-face democracy,
actually hope for better. And our failure at achieving even decency to this
point might indicate that we should be aiming even higher if we only want to
satisfy the lesser condition. When we do, if we do, and adopt a form of the
proposal endorsed here, we might have something to help the neorepublicans (like Sandel) cure "democracy's discontent. ' '30 1 We could point
to a distinctly American procedure that could be the basis for a substantive
civic voice.

300. See generally AVwSHAI MARGALUT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi Goldblum trans.,
1996) (1995).
301. See generally SANDEL, supra note 204.
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